This book is dedicated to the greatest and longest land battle ever waged by mankind. Its outcome changed the balance of power in the world and completed the process of destruction of old Europe begun by the First World War. Victorious Russia emerged from this battle as the only power capable of challenging - and perhaps even defeating - the United States of America in the field of technology and material power, that is, in those areas where the New World was accustomed to undeniable superiority.
Can any general conclusions be drawn from the study of this battle? I think so, but not of the sort that would be particularly pleasing to us in the West. Indeed, the matter looks in such a way that the Russians could independently, without any help from the Western powers, win this war or at least force the Germans to turn back by force of arms. The support they received from our participation in the war - the diversion of several enemy divisions, the supply of a significant amount of equipment - was of a secondary, and not decisive, nature. In other words, this assistance affected the duration, but not the outcome of the struggle. Of course, the landing of the allied troops in Normandy significantly fettered the German reserves. However, the threat of a "second front", especially its real creation, became a factor in the war only after the critical period of the struggle in the East had already passed.
The date when the German command began operational planning for a war with Soviet Russia is usually considered July 29, 1940. On this day, Reichengalle, the chief of staff of the operational leadership, Colonel-General Jodl, at a strictly secret meeting, outlined to a carefully selected group of staff workers and representatives of the economic administration of the Reich "the wishes expressed by the Fuhrer." A few weeks earlier, during the French campaign, Hitler had told Jodl: "I will take action against the threat of the Soviet Union as soon as the military situation permits." After the armistice with France, Hitler discussed this decision in more detail at the Berghof at meetings with Keitel, Jodl and Goering. The first OKW directive "Operation Aufbau Ost" was issued on August 5, 1940, and from that moment on, other sectors of the Nazi state apparatus were quickly involved in planning. When, in early September, the new Chief Quartermaster of the General Staff of the OKH, Major General F. Paulus, took up his post, he found among other documents "an as yet unfinished operational plan for an attack on the Soviet Union."
The next directive (No. 18), issued on November 12, 1940, was more specific. In it, Hitler wrote:
“In order to clarify the current position of Russia, political negotiations have begun. Regardless of the outcome of these negotiations, all preparatory arrangements concerning the East, concerning which oral orders have been given, must continue. Instructions on this matter will be given as soon as the general draft of the OKH operational plans has been presented to me and approved.
It would be wrong to say, as many German writers do, that the November 1940 talks between the USSR and Germany accelerated or even inspired the planning for war with the Soviet Union. The start of the campaign in the East was already scheduled for the spring of 1941, the earliest date by which it was physically possible to transfer and deploy the German army. The position taken by the Soviet Union in these negotiations may have strengthened Hitler in his intention and served as a convenient excuse for him, but he made a principled decision during the campaign in France, when he saw how the German panzer divisions dealt with the French army.
But although planning for an attack on the Soviet Union began in the summer of 1940, the plan arose much earlier, as evidenced, in particular, by Hitler's famous speech at a meeting in the Berghof on August 22, 1939. Of all the speeches and solemn meetings in the history of Nazism, it is this "narrow" meeting that most clearly illustrates the diabolical, anti-human essence of Nazism. On that day, Hitler was literally bursting with self-confidence, and he hysterically: “Probably there will never again be a person who would be endowed with such power and enjoy the confidence of the entire German people, like me ... Our enemies are people below the mediocrity, these are not figures, not masters, these are worms. In any case, Hitler assured his listeners, the Western powers would not come out in defense of Poland, “Now we can strike at the very heart of Poland - I ordered my SS “Dead Head” units to be sent to the East with an order to destroy men, women without mercy and pity and children of Polish origin.
At that moment, says one of the participants in the meeting, Goering jumped on the table and, "shouting bloodthirsty thanks and bloodthirsty assurances," began to dance like a savage. "The only thing I'm afraid of," continued Hitler, "is that at the very last moment some bastard (Schweinhund) will come up with a mediation offer." As for the future, there is no time to waste. The war must begin while I live. The treaty with the Soviet Union is intended to buy time, and in the future, gentlemen, the same thing will happen to Russia that I will do to Poland. We will crush the Soviet Union."
With these last words, the euphoria caused by Hitler's bravado noticeably dissipated, and at the end of the Führer's speech, "certain skeptical participants in the meeting remained silent." For in this statement, a heresy, unforgivable from a military point of view, was expressed in passing, which all German generals unanimously agreed to eradicate forever - "a war on two fronts." Even the most devoted Nazi generals never considered it possible to attack the Soviet Union as long as the Western Front existed. Yes, and in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" this was considered a cardinal mistake, a fatal step that would nullify all the successes achieved by the Reich on the path to world domination.
But a year later, when the idea of a war with Russia began to materialize into operational plans, Hitler had some reason to say that the Western Front no longer existed. The French capitulated and signed a truce, while the British were isolated on their island, where, powerless to do anything, they licked their wounds. In the warm rays of victory over France, having achieved absolute dominance over Western Europe, Hitler had reason to say that the campaign against Russia would not be the second, but the first and last front.
As, however, often happens in the international affairs of a state, planning, after it has begun, inexorably acquires scope and internal dynamism, while the character and accents of the conditions in which it originated have already changed. The German Air Force (Luftwaffe), which until recently dominated the air, received a fitting rebuff. Some areas of the sky over Western Europe turned out to be inaccessible to him. Shortcomings were revealed in the operational management and technical equipment of the Luftwaffe. The German navy suffered heavy losses during the Norwegian campaign. The U-boat building program lagged behind and was poorly planned—in the summer of 1940, Germany had only 14 U-boats capable of operating west of England.
These circumstances made it very difficult to strike at England, and if the British remained unshakable in their decision to continue the war, it was impossible to conquer England without long and careful preparation and revision of priorities. But there was little time - in any case, Hitler thought so: "... a criminal or a madman can kill me at any moment." The German land army, however, was in full combat readiness and had not yet known defeat. Of the three branches of the armed forces, she was the only one to fulfill all the tasks assigned to her. It would be absurd to allow this magnificent war machine to fall into disrepair, or to rebuild it for amphibious operations to fight a naval power in its own element! The hegemony that Hitler had established over the recalcitrant generals in politics was now undeniable. Moreover, Hitler apparently believed that his personal power over the army would be further strengthened as a result of the Eastern campaign with its strong ideological overtones and the close attention that he was going to pay to its implementation.
In 1930, Hitler wrote: “Armies do not exist to prepare the world. They exist to win the war." And in the spring of 1941, the German armed forces were victorious, almost never known casualties, excellently trained and equipped. It was a perfectly balanced and controlled combat vehicle, which then reached the zenith of military glory. Where was she supposed to go now? The simple force of attraction, it seemed, should have directed her against the only enemy left on the European continent; to carry her away, like Napoleon's army, which also once stood disappointed on the banks of the English Channel, to the East, to the dark, unconquered expanses of Russia. The Red Army in the summer of 1941 was as much a mystery to the British and French intelligence services as it was to German intelligence. At the beginning of 1941, the Abwehr believed that the Soviet Armed Forces numbered no more than two hundred combat-ready divisions. After the war, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, said: "It was a gross miscalculation: the number of divisions, most likely, reached three hundred and sixty." In fact, the initial figure was much closer to the truth, but the mobilization mechanism in the Soviet Union proved to be very effective and managed to put more than one million people under arms by the end of July. This was the greatest achievement. However, Hitler believed that the Soviet war machine was incapable of functioning properly. “One has only to kick at the door,” he told Field Marshal von Rundstedt, “and the whole rotten building will collapse.”
But whatever criteria Hitler used in evaluating the military potential of Russia, he did not take into account one extremely important factor: the Wehrmacht was to face an enemy of a completely different kind than the unstable and pliable Western countries.
swords crossed
“Burdened with heavy worries, doomed to months of silence, I can finally speak freely.
Germans! At that very moment, a campaign began, which, in its scope, had no equal in the world. Today I again decided to entrust the fate, the future of the Reich and the German people, into the hands of our soldiers. May God help us, especially in this struggle.”
Hitler's proclamation was read by Goebbels, who made a radio address to the German nation at 7 am on June 22, 1941. Three and a half hours earlier, the flashes of volleys of 6,000 guns lit up the predawn sky in the East, unleashing a flurry of fire and death on the Russians, taken by surprise.
What a terrible moment in history! The two largest armies in the world clashed. No battle in human history compares to this one. Even the colossal military operations of August 1914, when all the railways in Europe spurred mobilization, and the last weary onslaught of the Allied armies on the "Hindenburg Line" in 1918, pale before her. In terms of the number of men, the weight of ammunition, the length of the front, the desperate fury of the fighting, the day of June 22 will never be surpassed.
German troops deployed between the Baltic and Black Seas were united in three large army groups: Army Group North under the command of Field Marshal von Leeb (18th and 16th field armies and 4th tank group); Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock (9th and 4th field armies, 3rd and 2nd tank groups) and Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal von Rundstedt (6th and 17th field armies, 1st tank group). In accordance with the well-established practice in Poland and France of using armored forces, the German tank divisions operated separately from the infantry and were concentrated in four groups under the command of energetic and experienced tank generals - Hoepner, Hoth, Guderian and Kleist.
The deployment of German troops outwardly seemed to correspond to three main goals - Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine. But in fact, the "main idea" of the operation "Barbarossa" in geographical terms was not clearly formulated. In the most general terms, the task of reaching the line Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan was stated, but it was said with all certainty that the main goal was purely military in nature:
The destruction of the "main forces of the Russian ground forces" in the western part of the Soviet Union ... in bold operations by deep, rapid advancement of tank wedges" and further: "The retreat of the combat-ready enemy troops into the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented."
Hitler at that time had no intention of fighting for the cities of the Soviet Union, especially within them. The battle for France was won by a dash for the English Channel, not by an advance on Paris.
In addition to the advantage of a sudden strike, the Germans ensured for themselves an overwhelming superiority in manpower, equipment and firepower in the sectors of the front designated for tank breakthroughs. According to Halder's plan, all the armored forces of the Wehrmacht were thrown into this initial offensive. Four panzer groups were to punch holes in the Russian defensive lines with the first blow, then go around from the rear, surround and split apart the Soviet armies standing at the border.
On the northern sector of the front, the Germans launched three tank divisions (more than 600 tanks) into the offensive, in the center where the most powerful German grouping was concentrated, nine tank divisions - about 1,500 tanks, struck, in the southern sector of the front - five tank divisions - 600 tanks. Not surprisingly, by the afternoon of June 22, the forward detachments of all four German tank groups, leaving behind them the fading rumble of guns, quickly raced along dry, undamaged roads deep into the Soviet defenses.
These "reconnaissance detachments" consisted of motorcyclists, armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers with anti-tank guns attached to them, and several light and medium tanks. On the roads they moved at a speed of 40 km / h. Following close behind them was the bulk of the tanks, maintaining constant radio contact with the forward detachment and ready to turn into attack formations on a signal if the vanguard ran into resistance. Behind the tanks in the rear guard moved a mixed group of motorized infantry and divisional artillery. The advancing tank division with such a construction in a column stretched for 10-16 kilometers. By the evening of June 22, the advanced tank divisions, having overcome the border strip, where fighting was still going on, broke through to a depth of 30 to 50 kilometers.
On this first day of the war, the 56th tank corps of General Manstein managed to advance the furthest on the northern sector of the front, which, having crossed the Soviet-German border at dawn, captured the bridge over the Dubisa River in Aregal by sunset - a throw of 80 kilometers! On the central front, columns of Guderian's tanks, bypassing Brest on both sides, captured Kobrin and Pruzhany.
But before dark, it became clear that this campaign was significantly different from the previous ones. Like a giant beast caught in a net, the Red Army fought back desperately, and as the reflexes awakened in the remote corners of its body, the resistance grew. Until that day, the Germans were accustomed to the fact that the encircled enemy units quickly stopped resisting and died. The defensive perimeter was reduced, the flanks were compressed, sometimes weak attempts were made to break out of the encirclement or counterattack, and then - surrender, capitulation. The speed and depth of tank strikes, continuous air attacks and, most importantly, the carefully worked out interaction of all branches of the armed forces created an aura of invincibility for the Wehrmacht, which no other army had had since the time of Napoleon. However, the Russians, ignoring this military reputation of the Wehrmacht, acted very differently.
The reaction of the encircled formations was always energetic and offensive. Entire divisions gathered into a fist and immediately went on the offensive, "moving to where the rumble of artillery cannonade came from." By noon, large groups of Soviet bombers began to appear over the battlefield, which were based far from the border and, because of this, avoided a sudden morning attack by German aircraft on Soviet border airfields. During the first two days of fighting, the Soviet Air Force lost about 2 thousand aircraft, and the Soviet armies, deprived of air cover, found themselves in a difficult situation. Until almost the end of the year, Russian troops will have to fight with minimal support from their air forces and quickly adapt to the operational restrictions caused by these circumstances.
* * *The erroneous location of the frontier armies of the Western Special Military District made them vulnerable to outflanking. If the commander of the district troops, General of the Army D. G. Pavlov, had approximate equality with the enemy opposing him in the infantry, then the Germans had an overwhelming superiority in tanks - as many as three tank groups of Gepner, Goth and Guderian. Three armies of the district - the 3rd, 10th and 4th stood at the front line, stretching from Grodno to the Pripyat marshes. There were five mechanized corps in the district (in fact, slightly larger than the German tank divisions), which were scattered throughout the district and were in the process of active training and staffing.
On the first day of the war, the 4th Panzer Group Gepner, hitting the right flank of the Russian 3rd Army, punched a deep gap between the adjacent flanks of the Northwestern and Western fronts, where Manstein's tank corps burst into, Russian counterattacks in the afternoon ran into full power German tank divisions expanding the gap. By evening, three Soviet divisions were dispersed, and five others suffered serious losses. The 14th mechanized corps, stationed in the area of Pruzhany - Kobrin, was subjected to such a strong blow from German aircraft that it could not concentrate. The 13th mechanized corps, which was closer to the border and entered the battle by evening, due to a lack of fuel, ammunition and technical breakdowns, could not organize a sufficiently powerful strike.
During the night, Pavlov tried to create a cavalry-mechanized group under the command of his deputy, Lieutenant-General I.V. German group.
But it was not possible to deliver orders in a timely manner and collect the scattered units during that hectic night. In any case, the next morning only one 11th mechanized corps was in the starting area. The 6th mechanized corps and the cavalrymen, still on the way, were attacked by the Luftwaffe and suffered serious losses. On June 24, Boldin finally launched a counterattack, but the losses in personnel and materiel and the isolated nature of the offensive doomed this operation in the end to failure. By this time, the Northwestern Front, having lost its tanks, was quickly disintegrating, the surviving Soviet armies retreated to Riga, exposing the approaches to Daugavpils (Dvinsk). On June 26, Manstein's 56th Panzer Corps entered this city and captured the strategically important bridge across the Western Dvina River.
In an effort to cover his right flank and re-establish contact with the Northwestern Front, Pavlov continued to transfer divisions singly from the 10th Army to the north to reinforce the weakened 3rd Army, essentially leaving Minsk without cover. Meanwhile, the 4th army of General Korobkov, under pressure from von Kluge's troops, retreated to the east from the front, and its left flank was cut and deeply engulfed by Goodrian's 2nd Panzer Group. On June 25, his panzer divisions northeast of Slonim, together with the tankers of Goth, tightened the encirclement loop around the Soviet infantry units moving away from Bialystok; On June 26, the 47th Panzer Corps captured Baranovichi, and on June 27, the 17th Panzer Division of this corps, covering a distance of 50 miles, reached the southern outskirts of Minsk, where it met with the 3rd Panzer Group of Gota, closing the second, outer encirclement around troops of the Western Front.
In the south, the Red Army offered stubborn resistance, although it suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos (Kiev Special Military District) had at his disposal larger forces than his unlucky northern neighbor General Pavlov - four armies, three mechanized corps (22, 4 and 15 near the border), the 8th corps in reserve and two in the second echelon (9th and 19th). But these powerful forces were squandered in a series of isolated counterattacks, and as a result of command errors and the inability of senior officers of the Red Army to manage large armored formations, this strongest Russian tank grouping lost its strike power even before the really critical phase of the fighting on the southern flank of the Soviet German front.
On June 22, Kirponos ordered all three corps in reserve to advance to the front, meaning to concentrate them northeast of Rovno and strike, together with the 22nd mechanized corps (which was already there), on the left flank of the von Kleist tank group. However, even on the first day of the war, the 22nd mechanized corps was drawn into continuous battles in parts and suffered heavy losses. The 15th mechanized corps, which struck from the south, could not break through the dense anti-tank defense of the Germans. By the time the 8th Mechanized Corps completed its forced march, the situation had deteriorated so much that it had to go into battle alone. Soviet tankers again suffered heavy losses, but higher discipline and better materiel (there were T-34s and KVs in the corps) allowed the corps to maintain its combat effectiveness. When at last the 9th and 19th mechanized corps pulled up, the critical state of affairs forced them to engage in battle on the move and separately. Inexperienced tank crews, exhausted by four days of marches and continuous German air raids, found it difficult to resist the experienced tankers of the German 1st Panzer Group, who knew well how to rally, when to disperse, when to open fire and how to skillfully use the terrain. In addition, many already worn-out BTs and T-26s were out of order as a result of mechanical breakdowns, others were lost as a result of air strikes. Nevertheless, having suffered heavy losses, Kirponos still managed to maintain the integrity of his front for a while, and when his tank forces exhausted themselves in battle, he gave the order to withdraw to the old Soviet-Polish border.
Although the position of the Russians seemed desperate, and the power puzzled the Germans. “The enemy operating against Army Group South,” Halder grumbles displeasedly in his diary, “has a firm and energetic leadership.” The next day, he will again note: "We should pay tribute to the Russian command in Ukraine, they are acting well and energetically."
However, in Belarus, a significant part of which was captured by the Germans a few days later, only the most capable commanders survived. The commissars, together with the most courageous and far-sighted officers of the Red Army, spent days and nights tirelessly trying to form new units from unarmed reservists, soldiers who had fallen behind their regiments or returned from vacations, garrison units. Structures were blown up, warehouses were set on fire, field fortifications were hastily built, cattle were driven to the East.
Halder's reaction was typical of all Germans. At first, there was rejoicing: the Germans counted the losses of the Russians, measured the distance that the German troops had advanced, compared them with their achievements in the West, and came to the conclusion that victory was within easy reach. Then bewilderment: the Russians cannot continue to bear such losses, they must be “bluffing”, in a few days their reserves should be depleted. Further unrelenting anxiety: continuous, seemingly aimless counter-attacks, the willingness of the Russians to sacrifice themselves to kill the enemy, boundless space and a bleak horizon.
Already on June 23, Halder complains about the "absence of a large number of prisoners." On June 24, he complains: “It should be noted the stubbornness of individual Russian formations in battle. There were cases when the garrisons of pillboxes blew themselves up along with the pillboxes, not wanting to surrender. On June 27, he again expresses dissatisfaction with the "characteristically small number of prisoners."
For German infantrymen who fought face to face with the enemy, all this became obvious from the very first battles. But for the German tankers, the first few days, when their tanks, clanging their caterpillars, rushed past the villages untouched by the war with the inhabitants looking in confusion from doors and windows, seemed like the summer campaign of 1940 in the West.
However, this resemblance soon disappeared.
“Despite the fact that we are advancing for considerable distances ...,” wrote the captain of the 18th Panzer Division, “there is no feeling that we have entered a defeated country that we experienced in France. Instead, resistance, constant resistance, however hopeless it may be. A separate weapon, a group of people with rifles ... a man who jumped out of a hut on the side of the road with two grenades in his hands ... "
On June 29, Halder, summing up the military operations for the day, comes to the conclusion: “The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from the principles of the Rules; now it is unacceptable.”
There is something close to complacency in this entry. It is as if a dedicated graduate of the General Staff Academy is pleased to see that the rules of warfare are beginning to take their toll. But not only now, but forever. The Germans did not yet know this, but the first (and for their weapons the most successful) phase of the Eastern Campaign was already becoming a thing of the past.
On June 30, Halder celebrated his birthday, and the general staff of the OKH was in a festive atmosphere. Halder got acquainted with the latest reports from the commanders of the army groups and found them good. Russian troops retreated along the entire front. Of the several dozen aircraft shot down in a day, most were of obsolete types, including low-speed four-engine TB-3 bombers deployed from training airfields in Central Russia. Clearly, the enemy is throwing the last remnants of his reserves into battle. On the central front west of Minsk, most of the divisions of the three Soviet armies were surrounded in two “cauldrons”, and the path for unimpeded operations of the German tank corps turned out to be open. After eight days of fighting, the main forces of the Russians, who were in the border zone, were defeated and scattered, and, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the OKH on the same day gave the order to seize the crossings across the Dnieper.
It is difficult to describe otherwise than paradoxical the behavior of these punctual and polished staff officers, dressed that day in ceremonial uniforms, sitting at a table covered with a white tablecloth, and exchanging courtesies with each other. These people were in the brain center of the German fighting machine that fought on the Eastern Front. Every day they looked through reports from the front, which dispassionately reported on new incredible agonies of mankind: people dying of wounds and thirst, burning and destroyed villages, forcibly divided and captured family members. They heard Hitler’s statements about how he was going to deal with the Russian people, they knew about his refusal to comply with the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, about his intention to “raze to the ground” Leningrad in order to get rid of the large population of this city, about the notorious “order on commissars”. They also knew what the Nazi occupation meant: they fought in Poland and were direct eyewitnesses to the disgusting atrocities of the SD detachments. The supply records and troop transfer schedules in their dossier indicated that these Nazi criminals were once again operating in the neighborhood of German soldiers. However, it was not difficult for them to give up all this, and, like diligent schoolchildren, they had fun at the birthday party of their class teacher.
* * *During those first heady days of victory, when the Eastern Campaign seemed to be going according to an imputed plan, Hitler indulged in luscious dreams of a colonial East. It seemed that the most fantastic ideas of the Nazis - millions of square kilometers inhabited by Slavic slaves under the domination of a handful of representatives of the "master race" - were on the verge of implementation. Hitler planned to create a cross between British India and the Roman Empire: “A new type of person will arise, true masters ... “viceroys” ...”
Rosenberg's views on this matter were set out in a long memorandum as early as April 1941. For the most part, the document contains obscure nonsense, but its essence can be found in the following paragraph:
“The goal of our policy, therefore, in my opinion, is this: to revive in a reasonable form - and knowing what we want - the desire of all these peoples (the “oppressed nationalities” of the Soviet Union) for liberation and to give them some form of self-government , that is, carve out state formations from this vast territory ... aim them against Moscow, thereby freeing the German Empire for the coming centuries from the eastern threat.
This plan - "The Wall Against the Muscovites" - may have appealed to Hitler's imagination with its idea of legions keeping watch on the border with the barbarians, but the Führer rejected it.
Presented at a meeting on July 16, 1941, his own views on the future of the occupied eastern territories were as follows:
“Although German goals and methods should be hidden from the rest of the world, we will take and, in any case, we can take all necessary measures - executions, evictions and the like. The procedure is as follows:
the first is to capture
the second is to edit
the third is to exploit.
* * *While a regime of terror, arbitrariness and exploitation was being imposed on the territory of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans, the German armies continued their advance to the East. On July 1, the 4th Panzer Division crossed the Berezina at Svisloch, and the next day the 18th Panzer Division of Guderian's group captured the bridgehead at Borisov, entering this city at the same time as the 14th Motorized Division of the Gotha Panzer Group.
In the first days of July, part of the Soviet troops surrounded in the Slonim area, breaking the ring of German divisions with a decisive blow, broke into the forest, saddling the communications of the 18th Panzer Division, which fought near Borisov. The question arose about urgently sending reinforcements to her, and Guderian ordered the 17th Panzer Division, located south of Minsk, to immediately move to Borisov. Field Marshal von Kluge canceled this order.
It soon became apparent that the Russians intended to stubbornly defend the Dnieper lines, on July 6 a strong grouping of Soviet troops drove the German 10th motorized and cavalry divisions out of Zhlobin, and the attempt of the 3rd Panzer Division to capture Rogachev was repelled. The next day, the Russians launched a strong counterattack and pushed the 17th Panzer Division out of the town of Senno.
In the center of Guderian's advancing panzer group, the SS division "Reich" failed, which suffered heavy losses in an attempt to capture the bridges at Mogilev. Nevertheless, Guderian, having regrouped his troops, began preparations for the crossing of his tank corps across the Dnieper in the weakly protected sectors of the front near Kopys and Shklov.
By this time, in addition to the commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal von Kluge, other senior officers were also worried. Halder notes that “everyone (in the OKH) vying with each other tells terrible stories about the strength of the Russian troops (behind the tank group in the Pinsk marshes). First of all, radio intelligence, which believes that there are allegedly three tank and two rifle corps here. There were also alarming reports of a concentration of Soviet troops in the area of Bryansk and Orel, and of heavy fighter cover for rail traffic in that area.
On July 9, at dawn, Kluge flew to Guderian's headquarters "ordered the suspension of operations to force the Dnieper until the infantry units were brought up." Guderian argued that "the preparations have already gone too far to be canceled" and that ... "this operation will decide the outcome of the Russian campaign before the end of the year, if at all possible." After a heated argument, Kluge agreed to continue the offensive, but made the following remarkable judgment about Guderian's tactics: "Your operations always hang in the balance!"
On the front of Army Group North, the German command also began to show uncertainty, faced with stubborn resistance from the enemy. The Russians hastily transferred soldiers, tanks and aircraft from the Finnish border to reinforce the battle-weary armies of Generals M. M. Popov and F. I. Kuznetsov. These regular units, having rallied around themselves detachments made up of recruits, militias and militia, launched a series of violent counterattacks, as a result of which "on a number of sectors of the front the German troops found themselves in a critical situation."
As in many other cases, the desperate and costly Russian counter-attacks made the Germans nervous, and Field Marshal von Leeb, overestimating the enemy forces opposing him, made the first tactical mistake.
When the 4th Panzer Group resumed its offensive on July 2, the direction of the attacks of the two tank corps diverged: Reinhardt's 41st corps was aimed at the city of Ostrov, and Manstein's 56th corps moved to Opochka and Lovat.
A few days later, Manstein's 8th Panzer and 3rd Motorized Divisions were stopped by the Russians in a swampy area. The SS division "Totenkopf", Having achieved initial success, came across a fortified line of defense, where "its losses and lack of combat experience led to miscalculations and ... to protracted unforeseen battles." None of the three divisions of the 56th Panzer Corps could help each other, and after a week of unsuccessful fighting, two divisions were pulled back and sent to support the corps of General Reinhardt. The division "Dead Head" after this brief but bloody participation in real battles was returned to the "reserve", where it could take out its anger on the civilian population. Meanwhile, Reinhardt's tank corps occupied Ostrov, but he did not have the strength to advance further on Pskov and along the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi.
The more frequent mistakes of the German commanders in the northern and central sectors of the front can, of course, be attributed to various factors: indecision in the OKW, disagreements between the generals, etc. But the fact remains that even at this initial stage of the war the Germans swung at too much . Their armored formations were not strong enough and numerous enough to support the offensive in all three decisive directions.
Few of the German commanders understood this at the time, and each attributed their failures to other local causes. But on the wall maps at the Fuhrer's headquarters, the territory occupied by the Germans looked huge - especially in light of the fact that it took only a few weeks to capture it.
“No bastard will ever kick me out of here,” Hitler confidently declared to General Köstring, taking him to Rastenburg.
“I hope not,” Köstring, the last German military attache in Moscow, who knew the Red Army better than other Germans, replied with restraint.
First crisis
At this time, the first major failure occurred in the leadership of military operations in the East.
The latent conflict between the "amateur" Hitler and the "professional military" - the generals, which played an important role in the political evolution of the "Third Reich", from this moment begins to become important in terms of influencing the course of operations.
Of course, Hitler was not a professional. But all his life he studied military affairs. In the first months of the Second World War, his "pressure", risk appetite, his "intuition" brought very tangible successes.
But eight weeks after the start of the Eastern Campaign, the generals and Hitler switched roles. The OKH General Staff was almost unanimous in favor of reinforcing von Bock's armies and launching an offensive on a narrow sector of the front directly on Moscow. Hitler defended the orthodox solution according to Clausewitz's recipes - the methodical destruction of enemy forces on the battlefields, regardless of geographic targets and politically important centers. As early as July 13, he told Brauchitsch: “It is not so important to move quickly to the East as to destroy the enemy’s manpower,” and this concept, which he adhered to over the next two months, completely coincided with the goals that were defined by the Barbarossa plan, then there is the destruction of the Russian troops stationed in Western Russia and the prevention of their retreat into the depths of Soviet territory.
Outwardly, the problem looked simple, but extremely complex in essence and eluded solution. After the first rosy successes, the onslaught of the Wehrmacht began to weaken and the pace of the offensive slowed down.
In mid-July, the front line ran from north to south from Narva, on the Estonian border, to the mouth of the Dniester, on the Black Sea. But in the center of the front with two giant ominous protrusions in its configuration resembled the letter "S" reflected in the mirror. The tank corps of Army Group Center, advancing towards Moscow from the north and south of the Minsk Highway, had already reached Smolensk. But to the south, the Russian 5th Army continued to hold forward lines in the Pripyat marshes. This created an additional front 240 kilometers long, which ran along the exposed flanks of Army Group Center and the left wing of the southern Rundstedt grouping approaching Kiev.
The Russian "balcony", threateningly hanging over German communications, fettered the freedom of action of two groups of German armies at once. In addition, the Russians, wasting no time, made full use of their unusual gift of improvisation, which repeatedly rescued and will rescue them in this war with Germany. Under the leadership of the commander of the 5th Army, General M. I. Potapov, they vigorously restored the combat capability of regiments and brigades exhausted by battles, laid the foundation for the partisan movement and actively used the only maneuverable branch of the troops remaining in them - the cavalry.
The 5th Army and the units gathered around it were the largest formation, but there were many other Soviet units that continued to conduct military operations behind German lines, even if (unlike the 5th Army) they were completely cut off from the main front. Garrisons in Orsha and Mogilev, numerous groups of infantrymen hiding in the forests (some of them in the region of Minsk and Vilnius), the Baltic coast up to Tallinn and to the west - the continued resistance of all these "centers" gave weight to the arguments of those generals who believed that the Wehrmacht was dangerous scattered his powers.
In order to concentrate scattered formations and establish a clear priority for operational tasks, on July 19, the OKW issued Directive No. 33.
It noted that "Army Group Center will take considerable time to eliminate the strong enemy battle groups that continue to remain between our mobile formations", and expressed dissatisfaction that the northern flank of Army Group South was pinned down by the actions of the 5th Army and the ongoing defense Kiev. Therefore, "the goal of further operations should be to prevent the withdrawal of large parts of the enemy into the depths of Russian territory and destroy them."
To do this, carry out the following activities:
the concentric offensive of the Army Group "South" to destroy the 12th and 6th armies of the enemy;
through an offensive in close cooperation between the troops of the southern flank of Army Group Center and the northern flank of Army Group South, defeat the Soviet 5th Army;
Army Group "Center" will conduct a further offensive against Moscow with the forces of infantry formations. Its mobile formations, which will not participate in the offensive to the southeast (that is, against the 5th Army), should help Army Group North advancing on Leningrad by covering its right flank and cutting communications between Leningrad and Moscow;
Army Group North would continue its offensive on Leningrad as soon as the 18th Army came into contact with the 4th Panzer Group, and its eastern flank was securely covered by the 16th Army. At the same time, the army group should take possession of the naval bases in Estonia and prevent the withdrawal of Soviet units from Estonia to Leningrad.
Pretty clear. The directive was in fact an order to Army Group Center to halt (given the vast distances, "advancing" with one infantry meant nothing) until its flanks were secured.
The fact is that the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) and the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) were struck by the inexhaustible power of the Russian armies. For the generals at the headquarters of the OKH and OKW, the unnatural curves of the front line, reports of battles deep in the rear of the wedged German armies, the growing partisan movement looked not only something unusual, but also dangerous. Army Group Center was much stronger than the other groups, and it was supposed to split the Soviet front into two parts. However, despite its rapid advance and the successful completion of encirclement operations, the enemy maintained a coordinated command and control of the troops and offered the same stubborn resistance as at the beginning of the campaign.
The Germans were astonished to find themselves faced with an enemy who continued to fight even after being surrounded, as all German reports and reports of battles during this period unanimously testify.
“The Russians are not limited to countering the frontal attacks of our tank divisions. In addition to this, they are looking for every convenient opportunity to hit the flanks of our tank penetrations, which by necessity turn out to be extended and relatively weak. For this purpose, they use their numerous tanks. They are especially persistent in trying to cut off our tanks from the infantry advancing behind them. At the same time, the Russians, in turn, often find themselves surrounded. The situation sometimes becomes so confusing that we, for our part, do not understand: either we surround the enemy, or he surrounds us.
A constant source of concern for the high command of the ground forces was also the significant separation of the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian from the infantry divisions supporting them. The Germans did not have enough motorized infantry units, and the available motorized infantry acted together with tanks in the forefront of armored wedges. The bulk of the infantry divisions moved on foot, their rear economy relied on horse-drawn transport, and the pace was low. On July 17, the vanguards of von Kluge's 4th Army were still in Vitebsk, and the 9th Army of Colonel-General Strauss had not yet crossed the Western Dvina. But Hoth's tanks had already reached the northeast of Smolensk, and Guderian's advanced tank divisions had reached the Desna.
In addition to Hoth and Guderian, there were many other generals who advocated the throw of tank divisions to Moscow. The commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, also shared this intention. But taking into account what we now know about the strength of the Soviet armies even at that time and the counterattack they planned, there is no reason to believe that such a throw would have been successful. It would be a gigantic adventure, about which only one thing can be said with certainty - it would hasten the end of the war.
Hitler himself, as was often the case, took an ambivalent position. There is no doubt that he welcomed the support of those generals who shared his desire to refrain from attacking the Soviet capital on a narrow front. But he was not going to agree with their recommendations to limit the scope of operations. The commander of the Army Group "South" von Rundstedt at that time proposed to suspend operations in the central and southern sectors of the front and concentrate forces against Leningrad in order to clear the Baltic Sea of Soviet troops and connect with the Finnish troops before winter. But Hitler believed that, having created strong, mobile groupings in the north, where Leningrad should be “isolated” and “left behind”, and in the south, the tank armies would quickly close the pincers behind the Soviet capital, surrounding Moscow with a steel ring, and everything stubbornly fighting on the outskirts of the army of Marshal Timoshenko. It will be "super-Cannes", the greatest battle of annihilation in the history of mankind. Thus, in the last week of July, both in the OKH and in the OKB, the general opinion was that the offensive of Army Group Center should be suspended. However, a few days after the appearance of Directive No. 33, events at the front made the conclusions contained in it obsolete.
* * *The original intention of the Russians was to create a line of defense from Vitebsk south to the Dnieper and then down the left bank of the river. To hold this line, new armies were allocated from the Reserve Front under the command of Marshal S. M. Budyonny. But the actual collapse of the Western Front in the last days of June forced the Headquarters of the High Command to introduce new formations into battle piecemeal. On July 2, all these armies were transferred to the Western Front, commanded by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
Timoshenko was desperately trying to establish command and control of troops on his unstable concave front. In its rear, on the lines of Ostashkov - Yelnya - Bryansk, a new front of reserve armies was urgently created. However, the continuous three-week onslaught of the advancing enemy was too strong and did not allow the creation of a stable front and timely concentration of troops. As a result, the Russians continued to suffer serious losses in manpower and equipment. On July 6, the 5th and 7th mechanized corps were thrown in parts into a counteroffensive in the Lepel direction against the divisions of Gotha, but after stubborn three-day battles they were defeated and retreated. On the evening of July 15, the Germans broke into Smolensk, pushing back the divisions of the 16th Army of General Lukin, who had an order from the State Defense Committee to defend this city. In the Mogilev area, most of the formations of the 13th Army were surrounded. Nevertheless, the Russians continued to fight with an indomitable heroism that even Halder admired, and their “wild tenacity,” which he would often lament in his diary, gradually undermined the armed strength of the Wehrmacht.
The intensity of the combat events, which had a severe effect on the German troops and materiel, differed sharply from the "maneuvers with live ammunition" in the summer of 1940 on the Western Front. But if this fierce fighting was something new and alarming for the Germans, then for the Russians the situation was critical.
By the end of July 15, Goth's tank divisions, which were rapidly advancing from the Vitebsk region around Smolensk from the north, reached the Dukhovshchina-Yartsevo region and turned south towards the divisions of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, while south of Smolensk the German tank corps captured Bykov and advanced to the confluence of the Sozh and Oster rivers in the Roslavl region. On July 18, motorcyclists of the 10th Panzer Division reached Yelna, and after a twelve-hour battle, the division captured the city the next day. All Soviet armies between the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian were drawn into the fiery whirlpool of the battle that flared up around Smolensk.
With the encirclement of the Soviet armies in the Smolensk region and the capture of Yelnya, it seemed to Guderian that he had created favorable conditions for a swift rush to Moscow, which Bock, Halder and Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, hoped for.
Perhaps Hitler shared his dreams of "super-Cannes" only with a narrow circle of close associates, but he made no secret of his dislike for the idea of a frontal attack on the Soviet capital and emphasized this after the adoption of Directive No. 33. "... At the moment, - wrote Halder on July 23, - Moscow is not at all interested in the Fuhrer, and all his attention is riveted to Leningrad ... "The most that Brauchitsch could achieve was permission to postpone the implementation of Directive No. 33, because" ... the mechanized formations of Army Group Center , which the Fuhrer has assigned tasks, need a 10-14-day respite in order to restore their combat capability.
Since 1945, the views of the proponents of the thesis that the Wehrmacht should have launched a swift offensive on a narrow front against Moscow as early as July have enjoyed unhindered circulation. It is always easier to extol the virtues of a hypothetical alternative than to justify a disappointing reality. In addition, all the opponents of this strike in the center of the front are dead. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, and Hitler himself did not have time to publish exculpatory memoirs. An impartial study of the facts shows how dangerous the position of the German troops was at that moment. The Germans managed to transfer no more than ten divisions across the Dnieper, and these divisions advanced eastward for another 180 kilometers. and to the south of the German wedge, four Soviet armies had enough forces to cover and cut its base. In addition, German equipment, and especially tanks and vehicles, needed to be repaired. The Germans experienced difficulties in delivering ammunition for divisional artillery, and even more so in transferring larger-caliber guns to the front line to storm the fortified positions of the Russian troops, and dive bombers for these purposes proved to be an unsatisfactory substitute.
In fact, in these days, the "life line" of von Kluge's troops was stretched to the limit; it is even more appropriate to compare the position of his troops with a cyclist balancing on a tightrope. The 2nd Panzer Group had to either maintain forward movement - and thus balance - or break loose and fly down. Meanwhile, Marshal Timoshenko, with twenty new divisions, was preparing to put a stick in her wheels.
That the Russians regarded the situation as extremely dangerous can be seen from the fact that they immediately threw the tank brigades they had into battle, instead of saving them for a joint counteroffensive with the reserve armies deployed in the Vyazma and Bryansk region. For Timoshenko, more than ever, it was necessary to link up with the divisions that were stubbornly fighting in the encirclement in the Smolensk region and restore the defenses along the northern Dnieper.
Accordingly, Timoshenko ordered the operational groups of troops, urgently created from divisions of the reserve armies in the area of Spas-Demyansk and Roslavl, to launch a counteroffensive as soon as they approached the battlefield, and instructed the Soviet units in Orsha, Mogilev and in the vicinity of Smolensk to break through in a southerly direction. . These attacks on the rear and the right flank of the enemy were intended to reduce the German pressure on Smolensk, and evidence that the Russians succeeded did not have to wait long. On July 22, Guderian reported that "all parts of the 46th Panzer Corps are currently fighting and are pinned down for some time", and from the 47th Panzer Corps "... there is nothing more to be expected yet." To supplement the concentric pressure on the German wedge, the Russian troops encircled at Smolensk launched furious counterattacks. The city was continuously shelled, and the Germans could not use either the highway or the railway. The 17th Panzer Division, transferred here from Orsha, was involved in heavy fighting, its commander, General Ritter von Weber, was mortally wounded.
The first result of these attacks was the exit to the east of a significant part of the Russian divisions surrounded near Smolensk. At least five divisions left on the night of July 23, and on July 24 the remnants of three more. At the same time, the Russian offensive against Yelnya and northwest of Roslavl was gaining momentum. Reports from the German 10th Panzer Division show that it has lost a third of its tanks. Between Cherikov and Yelnya, the Germans counted 18 fresh Russian divisions, and the commander of the 46th Panzer Corps, Witingof, reported that the Russians were “attacking from the south, east and north with massive artillery support. Due to the lack of ammunition, the corps is able to hold only the most key positions.
At this point, oddly enough, the impromptu nature of the Russian counter-offensive began to have a deeper impact than the mixed success of the fighting would suggest. For the first time, the regular infantry divisions of von Kluge's 4th Army were drawn into the battle for the Dnieper. By the evening of July 25, there were three of them, and three days later there were already nine. And these units were brought into battle not to replace Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, but to reinforce it.
With such reinforcements, the 2nd Panzer Group should have won any battle. But the battles that she had to fight, in essence, were battles of local importance. They were not foreseen in the strategic development of the campaign, as originally planned by the OKB. And in this sense, the desperate Russian attacks "from the march", although they were costly and poorly planned, had a value that ultimately proved decisive. For, by fighting at the end of July to deprive the Germans of initiative on the key Western Front, the Russians introduced an element of uncertainty into German operational plans - uncertainty in the assessment of goals and capabilities - which exacerbated the differences in the German high command.
* * *On July 27, a meeting of army commanders was convened at the headquarters of the commander of Army Group Center von Bock in Borisov, at which Brauchitsch's order was read. Its essence boiled down to the fact that any immediate attack on Moscow or even Bryansk was ruled out. The immediate task was the final liquidation of the Russian 3rd Army, which was grouped around Gomel. This essentially meant that Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group had to turn more than 90 degrees and advance in a southwesterly direction.
Then, after further delay, another meeting was held in Borisov. On August 4, the Fuhrer himself arrived at von Bock's headquarters for the first time since the start of the Eastern campaign to hear reports from the army commanders.
Hitler talked with his commanders in private and one by one, so that none of them was sure what the others were saying, what they were offered and what they blabbed. He summoned Colonel Heusinger, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the OKH, who represented Halder, Bock, Guderian and Hoth. The last three were unanimous in favor of an attack on Moscow, but there was a certain inconsistency in their answers. Bock said he was ready to attack immediately; Goth stated that the earliest date his panzer group would be able to move was 20 August; Guderian claimed that his panzer group would be ready by 15 August, but asked for reinforcements.
Then Hitler called all the commanders together and gave them a long speech. He explained that Leningrad was the primary goal of the moment. After it is reached, the choice will lie between Moscow and Ukraine, and for strategic and economic reasons, he is inclined in favor of the latter. In essence, Hitler proceeded from defensive premises: the capture of Leningrad would isolate the Russians from the Baltic Sea and ensure the safe supply of iron ore from Sweden; the capture of the Ukraine would provide the raw materials and agricultural products needed by Germany for a long war; the capture of the Crimea eliminates the threat of the Russian air force to the oil-bearing region of Ploiesti. In addition, "... Army Group South seems to have created the prerequisites for victory in this area."
Unfortunately, we do not have records of Hitler's conversations with those closest to him at that time, but there is reason to believe that he was seriously concerned about the strength of the Russian resistance, but he would never admit this to professional soldiers. The shadow of Napoleon hovered over his head, as it did over every German officer on the Eastern Front, and he was determined not to give in to the temptation to march on Moscow until he created (as he believed) reliable strategic prerequisites.
The only statement that testifies to his mood - and a very remarkable one - was made at the same meeting. Refusing Guderian's request to send new tanks, Hitler said: "If I had known that the data given in your book about the power of the Russian armored forces were true, I think that I would never have started this war."
* * *The Soviet command was aware of the vulnerability of the gap in their front, which had arisen as a result of the capture of Roslavl by the Germans on August 1, but they had neither reserve units to plug it, nor vehicles to urgently send reinforcements into this sector. In the first days of August, a significant part of the Soviet divisions surrounded in the Smolensk region fought their way out of the encirclement near Yermolino and joined the Soviet armies defending on this front. Two German tank corps - the 46th and 47th - were still pinned down by battles on the Yelnin ledge, and although three more fresh infantry divisions were thrown to help them, the Germans were able to withdraw only one tank and one motorized division.
Thus, by strengthening their positions in the Yelnya area and continuing to continuously launch counterattacks, the Russians firmly held this key sector of the front. To the south, the 3rd Army and other Soviet formations that were part of the new Central Front urgently strengthened their positions on the Sozh River, continuing to put pressure on the approaching infantry units of the 2nd German Army.
As a result of the restraint shown by the Russians, the Germans failed to widen the gap they had made in the Roslavl area. To do this, they first needed to break the resistance of the Russians in the Yelnya region and on the Sozh River.
Neither Bock nor Guderian had the strength for such an operation. After spending two days in the Yelnya region, Guderian saw with his own eyes how, under the intensified onslaught of the Soviet troops, his soldiers were forced to leave their positions. Nevertheless, he put forward a plan to attack Moscow with his tank corps from the Roslavl region, bypassing Yelnya.
On August 11, the command of Army Group Center was officially notified that Colonel General Guderian's plan (for an attack on Moscow) was rejected as "completely unsatisfactory."
Bock considered it prudent to "agree with the cancellation of the plan," but a disgruntled Guderian responded by threatening to evacuate the bridgehead at Yelnya, "which is now of no use and is only a constant source of losses."
However, this was unacceptable to the OKH.
While the army commanders of the Center Group were engaged in endless selfish disputes, two events occurred that finally buried plans for an immediate march on Moscow. First, the attack on Leningrad, which began shortly after the Borisov meeting, ran into stubborn Russian resistance. On August 12-14, the command of the North-Western Front launched a counterattack near Staraya Russa and forced the German units to retreat. As a result, Hoth was forced to hastily transfer another tank corps from the Smolensk direction to help Leeb, and thus the Army Group Center was deprived of three more mechanized divisions, absolutely necessary for large-scale operations. With the departure of the tank corps to the north and south, the forces of Army Group Center were noticeably weakened, and ten days later (August 28) Bock would complain to Halder that “... the possibilities of resistance of the troops of his army group are coming to an end. If the Russians continue their offensive operations, then it will be impossible to hold the eastern sector of the front.”
But although the physical possibilities for the implementation of the cherished goal - an immediate throw on Moscow - were quickly drying up, the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) still defended this plan. On August 18, Brauchitsch finally decided to submit his proposals to Hitler in this regard. Jodl, as usual, backed down and did not support Brauchitsch, and Hitler completely rejected these proposals. The Fuehrer personally wrote to Brauchitsch and Göring a lengthy reply, criticizing the tactics of the OKH and pointing out further strategy. The tank formations of the Army Group Center, Hitler stressed, never managed to completely surround the enemy. They allowed themselves to break away too far from the infantry and "act too arbitrarily." The plans for future operations outlined by Hitler earlier in the order of the OKW Operations Headquarters of August 21, 1941, also show that preparations for the capture of Leningrad are receding into the background and that maximum efforts should be made on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front.
With the advent of this directive, the plan of attack on Moscow in the center of the front was officially buried. On August 22, Guderian received an order to "transfer combat-ready tank divisions to the Klintsy-Pochep region" on the left flank of the 2nd German Army. For the first time, the plan was also outlined for the offensive of part of the troops of Army Group Center in a southerly direction in cooperation with Army Group South. On August 24, after Guderian's meeting with Hitler at the headquarters of the OKH in East Prussia, the 2nd Panzer Group received an official order to advance south into the flank and rear of the Kyiv group of Soviet armies.
Leningrad: hypotheses and reality
The German attack on Leningrad began on August 8, and within a few hours the positions of the Soviet troops on the Luga River were in danger. Although a counterattack by two Soviet armies temporarily saved the Soviet front from collapse, the situation remained difficult. In the second half of August, German troops occupied Narva, Kingisepp, Novgorod, and on August 20, the SS division "Dead Head" captured Chudovo, cutting the Moscow-Leningrad railway.
In Leningrad itself, hundreds of thousands of citizens worked around the clock to build a wide belt of fortifications that encircled the city. The Leningrad party organization played an active role in mobilizing the population to defend the city.
We know, and the pages of this book will tell, how the deterioration of the military situation in Germany increased conspiracies, intrigues and betrayal in the camp of the Nazis. Naturally, the historian may be tempted to try to find evidence of similar strife in the Kremlin. But, despite the debunking of the "cult of personality" and a wave of critical revelations after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, there is no information about personal relations between Soviet leaders during crises, with the possible exception of one episode during the battle for Leningrad, in the autumn of 1941, when in At the end of August, a commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee headed by V. M. Molotov and G. M. Malenkov, authorized to “organize the defense”, arrived in the city to Zhdanov and Voroshilov. A few days later, the situation on the outskirts of the city deteriorated noticeably, and K. E. Voroshilov was relieved of his duties as commander of the Leningrad Front and recalled to Moscow. He was replaced in this post by General of the Army Georgy Zhukov, a "fireman", who in those years appeared and stabilized the situation on almost all dangerous sectors of the Soviet-German front.
Some Western historians explain this reshuffle by a dispute between Voroshilov and Zhdanov, as a result of which Zhdanov appealed to Stalin over Voroshilov's head.
But in fact there is no evidence of any internal conflicts during the entire blockade of Leningrad, except for the usual philistine discontent and grumbling. And in the autumn of 1941, when German troops were getting closer to the city every day, all Leningraders, young and old, were more united than ever.
The appeal addressed to the Leningraders said:
The enemy "... wants to destroy our homes, seize factories and plants, plunder the people's property, flood the streets and squares with the blood of innocent victims, abuse the civilian population, enslave the free sons of our homeland ...".
Leningraders believed this appeal and were right.
* * *It seemed to the Germans approaching the city that Leningrad was about to fall into their hands like a ripe watermelon. For their insatiable thirst for blood, the city presented a difficult problem.
The "problem", of course, was how to deal with its civilian population. Hitler's first "firm decision" was to "raze Leningrad to the ground, make it uninhabitable and get rid of the need to feed the population in winter." After the destruction of the city, the territory can be transferred to the Finns. The Finns, however, did not want to participate in this plan. International public opinion also had to be reckoned with: a bloody massacre of this magnitude would have to be explained somehow - even by those who saw Hitler as a deliverer from Bolshevism. Accordingly, Goebbels was instructed to fabricate the "recently discovered" "Russian plan", according to which the Soviet authorities themselves destroyed Leningrad.
The OKW Deputy Chief of Staff, General Warlimont, analyzed the "problem" of the civilian population in detail and prepared a memo. The "ordinary" occupation of the city is unacceptable. But it would be possible to evacuate the old children (probably to the gas chambers) and "leave the rest to die of hunger." The best solution, perhaps, would be to isolate the entire city, surrounding it with a fence of barbed wire under electric current, guarded by machine guns. But the “danger of an infectious epidemic” will remain (it is curious to note how often German plans for the mass extermination of people contain a reference to the “threat” of an epidemic) that could “spread to German front-line units.”
Therefore, if the proposed decision is adopted, corps commanders should be warned of the need to use artillery against the civilian population trying to escape from the city. In any case, "the decision on the fate of the inhabitants of the city cannot be entrusted to the Finns."
There was also an opportunity to extract propaganda capital from this case, namely, to offer "the philanthropist Roosevelt to send food to the inhabitants of the city who will not be captured, or to send ships of neutrals under the auspices of the Red Cross and take them to America ...".
Of course, however, if the response to these proposals takes a real form, this will not be acceptable. The correct solution would be “to seal Leningrad tightly, then to weaken it with terror (i.e., air bombing, shelling) and starvation. In the spring we will occupy the city ... we will take the surviving inhabitants into captivity into the depths of Russia and raze Leningrad to the ground with the help of explosives.
Jodl, Warlimont's immediate superior, approved this memo, noting that it was "morally justified" since the enemy de mined the city, leaving it (an interesting example of German thinking: Jodl, it seems, independently of Goebbels, came up with the same justification that and the Minister of Propaganda) and also because of - again - the "serious danger of an epidemic". True, Jodl briefly outlined a rather curious alternative: that part of the population of Leningrad should somehow be allowed to flee in panic from the city into the interior of Russia, arguing (not very logically) that this “will increase chaos and thereby help our management and exploitation of the occupied districts".
* * *After the breakthrough of the Soviet front on the Luga, Keitel, Chief of Staff of the OKW, turned to Mannerheim with a proposal that the Finnish army go on a "decisive offensive" on the Karelian Isthmus and also cross the Svir River northeast of Lake Ladoga. Mannerheim rejected this plan and did not change his mind even after the visit of Keitel, who personally negotiated with him on 4 September.
From a military point of view, this stubbornness on the part of the ally was extremely unpleasant for the Germans. Their armed forces were fully engaged and the Wehrmacht had no strategic reserves. The only form of the main tactical reserve was the transfer of tank and motorized formations from one army group to reinforce another. As a result, the OKW literally lacked the means to build up pressure on the Leningrad front of the Soviet armies without bringing in Finnish troops or pressuring the Finns into submission to their demands. Thus, by the beginning of September, objective prerequisites arose in favor of the decision to “block” Leningrad instead of storming and capturing this city.
Hitler, who was impatiently following the progress of the operation on the northern and southern flanks of the Eastern Front, had already begun planning the capture of Moscow.
On September 6, he issued Directive No. 35, providing for the return of Panzer Groups Hoth and Guderian to the central sector of the Eastern Front and preparations for a decisive offensive against the Soviet capital. Since the tank divisions suffered significant losses, it was also necessary to additionally transfer the Center Army Group and the 4th Gepner Panzer Group. The directive further ordered the deployment of the 8th dive bomber air corps from air bases in Estonia to the south in support of von Bock's armies.
Hitler decided to assign the status of a "secondary theater of operations" to the Leningrad region, and entrust its blockade to six or seven infantry divisions.
Such a force would be strong enough to contain the starving inhabitants of Leningrad behind a barbed-wire fence, but far from sufficient to cope with the Soviet armies defending the city, even if the battles were weakened and short of weapons at that time. In addition, even after the capture of Shlisselburg by the Germans on September 8, the blockade was far from tight and left the Leningrad garrison a dangerous freedom of maneuver for the Germans.
Understanding this and knowing, according to rumors from the OKH, about the forthcoming directive, Leeb drew up a plan to capture Leningrad by storm. He had hoped to launch the offensive on September 5, the day before receiving the directive, but Reinhardt's 41st Panzer Corps was so weakened by the fighting that it needed a three-day respite to re-equip and replenish while the German infantry secured on the left bank of the Neva and repelled the fierce counterattacks of the 54th Soviet army south of Lake Ladoga.
On September 9, the 41st Corps went on the offensive, the 1st Panzer Division attacked along the left bank of the Neva, and the 6th Panzer Division advanced on both sides of the railway leading to Leningrad. Both divisions were soon bogged down in a line of anti-tank ditches and defensive earthen fortifications built in the preceding weeks by construction battalions and militias.
The Russians lacked artillery and many other types of weapons that were not produced in Leningrad itself. But they made extensive use of mortars, and in coastal areas, heavy guns from ships of the Baltic Fleet fired at German rears and batteries. On the battlefield alone and in pairs, heavy KV tanks operated, which were often driven by drivers and mechanics from the Kirov plant, which still produced about four tanks a day. In these stubborn, sometimes hand-to-hand fights, Russian qualities - courage, stamina, skillful use of camouflage and ambushes - more than made up for the lack of military equipment and miscalculations of command in command and control of troops and tactics, which led to defeats in border battles and at the Luga defensive line.
The German panzer divisions, having run into a solid defense, suffered heavy losses. On the very first day of the offensive, the 6th Panzer Division lost four successive commanders in a row.
To justify von Leeb's decision to storm Leningrad after receiving Hitler's directive, it can be recalled that all senior German officers considered the war with Russia already won. The question for them was not "whether" the victory was won, but "how"? And more importantly, "who"? Who will be crowned with laurels for these brilliant achievements in the military field? Even Guderian, who was one of the first to feel the power of the resurgent power of Soviet weapons, believed at that time that his independent actions and strategy would bring the Germans victory before the end of 1941 - it could not have occurred to him that the alternative would be the complete defeat of Germany and the storming of Berlin. This self-confidence aggravated the intrigues between the generals in the OKH, led to their ignoring and failure to carry out unwanted orders and instructions.
It is clear that von Leeb wanted to distinguish himself by capturing the most important "fortress" of the Eastern campaign. And at first, his disregard for Hitler's directive seemed to pay off. By the evening of September 10, the Germans made their way to the so-called Duderhof heights, the fighting went on all night, and at dawn the next day, under the cover of aviation, the 41st Panzer Corps resumed the offensive around Duderhof from the south. The 1st Panzer Division lost so many tanks that half a battalion could be completed from the remaining ones, nevertheless, by the end of the day, the Germans managed to capture the Duderhof Heights. On the left flank, the German infantry, after stubborn fighting, made its way to the suburbs of Slutsk and Pushkin, and on the evening of September 11 captured Krasnoye Selo.
On the fourth day of the offensive, September 12, it became apparent in the OKH that a fierce battle had broken out in the theater from which the OKH was trying to get reinforcements. Hitler, however, issued a new directive. Whether on the advice of Keitel, an apologist for the capture of Leningrad and a friend of von Leeb, but most likely because the possibility of achieving a brilliant victory captured his imagination, the Führer now ordered:
“In order not to weaken the offensive ... aviation and tank forces should not be transferred until a complete blockade is established. Therefore, the date of transfer determined by Directive No. 35 may be delayed by several days.
This directive was actually an order to break into the city itself. In the next four days, the Germans slowly made their way to the city. They managed to capture Pulkovo, Uritsk and Aleksandrovka, where the terminus of the tram line that led to Nevsky Prospekt was located. But in this fierce battle, where settlements and key lines changed hands several times, the turning point has come when the attacking side suffers disproportionately high losses compared to the successes achieved. The decisive attack launched from three sides by the 6th Panzer and two Infantry Divisions against the Russian positions in the Kolpino area was repulsed, and on the same day the OKW, apparently disappointed with the results of the offensive, gave the order "immediately" to remove the 41st Panzer and 8th Aviation Corps. On the night of September 17, the 1st Panzer Division began loading the surviving tanks onto railway platforms in Krasnogvardeysk, and the 36th Motorized Division headed for Pskov under its own power. Only the 6th Panzer, which had suffered heavy losses, was delayed for several days to withdraw its soldiers from the battle and heal their wounds. On the evening of September 18, Halder wrote gloomily in his diary:
“The encirclement ring around Leningrad is not yet closed as tightly as we would like. It is doubtful that our troops will be able to advance far if we withdraw the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions from this sector. Given the need for troops on the Leningrad sector of the front, where the enemy has large human and material forces and means, the situation here will be tense until our ally, hunger, makes itself felt.
The overall effect of this von Leeb offensive on the course of the Eastern Campaign was unfavorable for the Germans. The transfer of Hoepner's panzer group to the south was delayed by ten days - and this happened at a moment when the time factor was already beginning to become especially important. And when the tank divisions finally left the Leningrad Front, they were not ready for further battles. They needed replenishment, re-equipment and rest. In short, more time was needed.
This offensive was the first and only attempt by the Germans to take Leningrad by storm. A leading Western historian who has studied the siege of Leningrad claims that by "removing the tank divisions from the front at a time when the capture of the city seemed certain, Hitler saved Leningrad." But is such a statement true? First, at that time, any considered calculation inevitably led to the conclusion that a prolonged blockade would eventually bring success. Indeed, the situation of Leningraders worsened significantly until the blockade was broken in 1943. Secondly, to assert that Leningrad was "saved" in 1941 means to deliberately agree that its capture by the 41st Tank Corps "seemed unconditional." This is a highly dubious assumption. Although the Germans were gradually making their way through the defensive fortifications to the outskirts of the city, ahead of them was still the prospect of protracted and fierce street fighting in a city with solid stone buildings and a whole labyrinth of rivers, canals, waterways. Under such conditions, numerous work detachments and militias, armed with bottles of gasoline and sticks of dynamite, can, as the defense of Madrid had previously shown, deal with a whole corps of professional soldiers.
In contrast to the efforts to break the northern flank of the Soviet armies and destroy Leningrad, the German operations on the southern wing of the front were crowned with clear success. All the goals set by Hitler in his Directive No. 33 and later clarified at various meetings with the commanders of the goal were achieved. The region of the Pripyat swamps was cleared of Soviet troops, the bend of the Dnieper was occupied, the crossings across the Dnieper were captured, tank wedges went deep into the Donets basin. The Russians lost their industrial enterprises in Ukraine: they were either evacuated deep into Russia or fell into the hands of the Germans. And most importantly, the Soviet troops on the Southern Front suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment as a result of German encirclement operations.
However, in essence, operations on this front from a strategic point of view turned out to be a failure for the Germans. They did not bring Germany closer to victory, and today we know that these German successes were not even a prelude to victory.
While Stalin undoubtedly bears a significant share of the responsibility for the failure of leadership and control of the Red Army in the early months of the war, it would be wrong to place all the blame on him, just as it would be wrong to place all the blame on Hitler for the failures of the Wehrmacht in the last years of the war. Under the command of Marshal Budyonny in the South-West direction there were about a million soldiers and officers. Was it not reasonable to expect that such large forces, even if they could not hold the line of the Dnieper, would give a strong enough rebuff to the enemy to thwart the German offensive. To withdraw such a large mass of troops behind the Dnieper in the conditions of German air supremacy would be extremely dangerous. Apparently, Stalin, as was always characteristic of him, also primarily took into account political factors. It is always easier to maintain the morale of the troops in positional defensive battles than during a long retreat, and it was undesirable for a number of reasons to leave a significant part of the territory of Ukraine for the German occupiers. This explains the decision to take up defense and give the Germans a fight near Kiev.
The results of this decision might have been different if this large mass of troops had been given skilful command. Timoshenko (who took over command of the surviving troops in Ukraine at the end of September) and Zhukov (who has a bigger mission ahead of him) could change the course of the battle for Kiev, if not defend the city itself.
The turn of Guderian's tank group to the south to attack the rear of the Kyiv group of Soviet troops took the Russians by surprise. The gap between the armies of Timoshenko, who fought in the area of Smolensk and Roslavl, and Budyonny, who defended Kyiv, was about 200 kilometers. The remnants of the 3rd Army and some other Soviet formations located in the Gomel region covered this gap to some extent, but only against attacks from the west. Tank columns of Guderian, advancing from the north, went to the rear of the 3rd Army. Already on the third day of the offensive, General Model's 3rd Panzer Division captured the bridge across the Desna in Novgorod-Seversky and overcame the last major natural barrier on its way to meet von Kleist's tanks.
Soviet historians place a certain blame on Generals F. I. Kuznetsov and A. I. Eremenko, who commanded the troops of the Bryansk Front, created on the flank of Guderian's tank group. But what forces did this front have at its disposal? Guderian's operational map shows that the Russians had only nine rifle and one cavalry divisions throughout the entire stretch from Roslavl to Novgorod-Seversky, and these divisions hardly exceeded brigades in their numbers. In addition, the advancing group of Guderian was mechanized, while the Soviet troops, who needed to concentrate before attacking the German columns, moved at the speed of a foot soldier.
On September 12, Kleist's tank divisions, breaking through the defenses of the Soviet 38th Army weakened by battles, broke out of their bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper near Kremenchug and on September 15 at Lokhvitsa joined with Guderian's divisions, closing the outer ring of the largest encirclement reached by the Germans in the entire Eastern campaign.
In the “cauldron”, General M.P. Kirponos, commander of the Southwestern Front, and his headquarters soon lost control of the troops, which were divided into detachments and groups that acted independently in accordance with (often conflicting) orders from corps and army commanders.
The encircled Russian troops did not have enough ammunition and fuel, and the breakthrough of the enemy ring was not organized and coordinated. But with proud tenacity, the Russians fought to the end. In the last fateful days, entire battalions would rush to counterattack with their last five rounds in their rifle magazines against German artillery positions, and in hand-to-hand combat, the Russians were ready to sink their teeth into the throat of the enemy.
When the fighting stopped, the Germans carefully counted the trophies and invited a large group of photojournalists and artists. In numerous photographs, columns of burned and blown up trucks can be seen; fire-blackened tanks with armor pierced and mangled by shells and bombs; stacks of rifles; long rows of artillery pieces, each of which the Russians blew up with the last shell laid in the breech. Numerous pictures of dead soldiers. Sometimes it is seen that they died in battle. On others, neat inscriptions say that these are victims of "punitive" operations.
The fate of Russian prisoners of war was especially tragic - long columns, with gloomy fatigue, wandering along the earth dotted with funnels. In the eyes of the prisoners - the stubbornness and detachment of people who fought for their homeland to the end, but were defeated. Could they guess what lay ahead of them? Starvation planned by the Germans, camps where typhus raged, hard labor around the clock at the Krupp factories under the whip of the SS. "Medical experiments", torture, four years of sophisticated atrocity, of the most disgusting and unforgivable kind. Did some of them intuitively realize that out of every thousand prisoners, less than thirty people would ever be able to see their home again?
But since we are asking these rhetorical questions, it is appropriate to ask one more.
Did the Germans, looking at these long black lines of prisoners, stretching across the steppe to the west, guess that they had sown the wind?
The first storm, more terrible than they have ever experienced, the Germans will reap in less than a year!
Notes:
Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, Germany was forbidden to maintain or build both on the right and on the left bank of the Rhine in a zone 50 kilometers deep east of the river, military installations, and also to maintain military units in this zone. The demilitarized status of the Rhineland was confirmed by the Locarno Treaties of 1925 guaranteeing Germany's western frontiers and arbitration. By entering troops into this zone, Hitler violated both the Versailles and Locarno treaties, but no sanctions against Germany from England and other Western states were adopted. - Note. transl.
The Anglo-German agreement of June 18, 1935 was one of the first major acts of the British policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany. It established the ratio of the navies of both countries: 1) the total tonnage of the German fleet should never exceed 35% of the total tonnage of the navy of the British Commonwealth of Nations; 2) the ratio of 35:100 will apply in principle both to the total tonnage and to individual classes of ships; 3) Germany has the right to a tonnage of submarines equal to the total tonnage of the Commonwealth's submarine fleet, but undertakes to maintain a submarine fleet not exceeding 45% of the Commonwealth's submarine fleet. England thus sanctioned Hitler's violation of the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. - Note. transl.
Czechoslovakia had 45 divisions, 1582 aircraft, 469 tanks, 5700 artillery pieces. Its border with Germany was covered by a strip of long-term defensive structures that was not inferior to the French Maginot Line. According to the "Grun" plan, the fascist command was going to use 39 divisions against Czechoslovakia. - Note. transl.
The bourgeois government of Poland, having entered into an agreement with fascist Germany, presented territorial claims against Czechoslovakia and in May 1938 concentrated three divisions and a brigade of border troops near the Czech border in the Teszyn region. The Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 obliged Czechoslovakia to satisfy the territorial claims of Poland, as well as Hungary. - Note. transl.
On March 21, 1939, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Polish ambassador, in an ultimatum demanded the transfer of Gdansk (Danzig) to Germany and the right to build an extraterritorial highway and railway through the "Polish Corridor", which would connect Germany with East Prussia, March in response memorandum, Poland rejected these demands. - Note. transl.
From Alan Clark's book "Barbarossa". Russo-German Conflict 1945, published in London in 1965 ( Clark A. Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945. London, 1965).
In this town was the department "L" (National Defense) of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW. - Note. transl.
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the OKH. - Note. transl.
From November 12 to 13, a Soviet delegation headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov was in Berlin to discuss issues of Soviet-German relations. - Note. transl.
There is no official record of this speech by Hitler. At the Nuremberg Trials, notes made by the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH F. Halder and Admiral G. Böhm, as well as an unsigned memorandum found in the archives of the OKW, were used. - Note. transl.
From June 22 to December 1, 1941, 219 divisions and 94 brigades were sent to the active army. See: 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, M., 1968, p. 273.- Note. transl.
The 11th German, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies were also on the territory of Romania and later went on the offensive, and a Hungarian mobile corps operated between the main forces of Army Group South and the Romanian troops. - Note. transl.
In total, Germany concentrated 153 divisions (4,600,000 men), more than 42,000 guns and mortars, more than 4,000 tanks and assault guns, and about 4,000 combat aircraft to attack the USSR. In addition, there were 37 divisions of Finland, Romania and Hungary (900 thousand people).
In the western border districts of the Soviet Union, there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades (2680 thousand personnel), 37.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1475 new KV and T-34 tanks and 1540 new types of combat aircraft. See: History of the Second World War 1939–1945, M., 1975, vol. 4, p. 21, 26, and also: Soviet Armed Forces. Questions and answers. History pages. 1918–1988 M., 1987, p. 218–220. - Note. transl. Note. transl.
Halder F. Military diary, vol. 3, book. 1. p. 60.- Note. transl.
During this period, Guderian's tank group was temporarily operationally subordinate to the commander of the 4th Army, von Kluge. - Note. transl.
Two mechanized corps, the 5th and 7th, took part in this counterattack, carried out at the direction of the Stavka. After three days of hard fighting, without air cover, they suffered heavy casualties and were forced to retreat. - Note. transl.
Lieutenant General M. M. Popov in June - September 1941 commanded the Northern, and then the Leningrad fronts. Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov in 1940-1941 was the commander of the Baltic Special Military District. At the beginning of the war he commanded the Northwestern Front, then the 21st Army (July - October 1941). - Note. transl.
Renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command after the appointment of I.V. Stalin on August 8, 1941 as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR. - Note. transl.
It consisted of six armies: the 29th, 30th, 24th and 28th, as well as the 31st and 32nd. On July 20, 14 divisions from the first four armies were assigned to carry out counterattacks in the Smolensk region. By order of the Headquarters of July 18, 1941, to organize defense on the distant approaches to Moscow west of Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Kaluga, the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense was also formed as part of the 32nd, 33rd and 34th armies. On July 30, these fronts were united into the Reserve Front under the command of General G.K. Zhukov. - Note. transl.
Halder F. Military diary, vol. 3, book. 1, p. 177.- Note. transl.
In the area of Yelnya - Smolensk. - Note. transl.
This refers to Guderian's book Attention, Tanks!, published in 1937, in which Guderian wrote that the Red Army was armed with more than 10,000 tanks.
For comparison, it can be pointed out that over the period from 1939 to June 1941, more than 7.5 thousand tanks of all types were produced in the USSR. - Note. transl.
The Central Front was created on July 24 as a result of the division of the Western Front as part of the 13th and 21st armies, and on August 1, the 3rd Army was also transferred to it. - Note. transl.
In this order, Hitler emphasized that the considerations of the OKH High Command "do not agree with my plans", and ordered that "the main task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Donets and depriving the Russians of the possibility of obtaining oil from the Caucasus; in the north, the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finns. - Note. transl.
On July 10, 1941, by the decision of the GKO, intermediate bodies of strategic leadership were created - the main commands of the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western directions.
Marshal Voroshilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction (A. A. Zhdanov was a member of the Military Council). On August 27, the State Defense Committee disbanded the main command of the North-Western direction, and from September 5, K. E. Voroshilov became the commander of the Leningrad Front, directly subordinate to the Headquarters. - Note. transl.
This refers to the appeal of the Leningrad City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the executive committee of the Leningrad City Council of Workers' Deputies and the Military Council of the North-West Direction, published on August 21, 1941. - Note. transl.
Halder F. Military diary, vol. 3, book. 1, p. 360.- Note. transl.
General F.I. Kuznetsov commanded the Central Front. On August 25, the Central Front was disbanded, and its troops were transferred to the Bryansk Front, which was created on August 16 at the junction of the Central and Reserve Fronts in order to prevent German troops from breaking through to the rear of the armies of the Southwestern Front. - Note. transl.
Four armies of the Southwestern Front were surrounded. 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th. - Note. transl.
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 7
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 8
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 9
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 10
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 11
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The game "Great Victory": the answer to Level 13
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7 o'clock 15 minutes. 22nd of June. Directive No. 2 was transferred to the western military districts:
“On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them ...
In connection with an attack unheard of in arrogance ... I order:
2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces. With powerful strikes by bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces ...
Timoshenko Malenkov Zhukov.
Pay attention to the names under the directive. In the first place is no longer Marshal Shaposhnikov. He was removed from his post and is already working in the Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
Our leadership did not have complete information about the situation on the western border. By this time, there was almost no one to inflict “powerful strikes” on the Germans by the forces of our “bomber and attack aircraft” in order to “destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces”. On the first day of the war, we lost more than 1,200 aircraft, most of which were destroyed in the stands by German air strikes, whose pilots knew very well which airfield and which aircraft they were supposed to destroy. Only the Odessa military district was lucky. On Saturday, June 21, the planes were relocated in connection with the preparation for the exercises.
The sobering of our leadership came when it realized the correctness of folk wisdom that the wind of the words of the mill does not turn.
At dawn, the enemy launched an offensive in three strategic directions:
Northern - to Leningrad, Central - to Moscow, Southern - to Donbass. The balance of power was as follows:
Germans with allies - 190 deployed divisions, of which 153 are German, incl. 19 armored and 14 motorized, 37 allied divisions - Hungary, Romania and Finland. The total number of more than 5.5 million officers and soldiers. Armed with 48,200 guns and mortars, 4,260 tanks, 4,980 aircraft, 217 warships, almost 75% of which were submarines.
Red Army: 170 divisions, incl. 103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 motorized, 7 cavalry and 2 engineering and signal brigades. We had an eightfold superiority in artillery, almost sixfold in tanks and in aircraft. Extremely poor provision of radio communications. Field and staff radios were of poor quality.
The first to take the blow were military sailors and border guards. The Navy of the Soviet Union met the enemy fully armed.
Black Sea. Sevastopol. Fleet locators spotted English planes still on the way in neutral waters. At 3.07 the bombers approached Sevastopol at a low altitude, but could not orient themselves, because. blackout was carried out in the city. Uninvited guests were already waiting. Searchlights flashed, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns opened fire. The planes hit the fire bag and were not difficult targets: they flew low, straight and not very fast. They arrived with heavy naval mines on parachutes, with which they intended to block the exits of warships from the bays. At 0308 the first English vulture was shot down. They began to drop sea mines anywhere, just not to die. Two and a half dozen enemy planes were shot down in the battle. Sevastopol is rightfully proud of the first downed enemy aircraft in the Great Patriotic War. They were British bombers! (Our leadership gave the British Ambassador in Moscow a good “hit in the neck”, and both sides are still silent about this fact). At 0315, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet reported to Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy, about the raid. Kuznetsov was the first to report the start of the war.
At dawn, German aircraft attacked 66 airfields.
At 14.00 June 22 Halder reported to Hitler that Air Force command reported about the destruction 800 enemy aircraft. German a The aviation managed to mine the approaches to Leningrad from the sea without loss. German losses are still 10 aircraft (from Halder's diary for 06/22/1941).
According to our official data, on the first day of the war we lost about 1200 aircraft, the vast majority were destroyed on the ground. I consider this figure to be false, because. only the Western Front on the first day of the war lost 735 aircraft, and there were 2 more fronts - the North-Western and South-Western, in which things were no better. German losses amounted to about 300 aircraft - the largest losses in a day in the Second World War. Every tenth German aircraft was destroyed as a result of air ramming (the real losses of the Germans were 15 times less than those that "composed the Kremlin storytellers." Opinion of the author).
According to the Barbarossa plan, by the end of September 1941, the advancing German troops should have already reached the lines: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan, destroying and capturing the Soviet troops fighting in this territory. There is a good Slavic proverb that everything was fine on paper, but they forgot about the ravines.
On June 23, the USSR began the mobilization of reservists from 1900 to 1913. This was supposed to give 14 million new soldiers and officers, but by the end of the calendar year.
The actions of the Soviet fronts in 1941 during the period of the "blitzkrieg"
First three weeks.
northern front
From the Barents Sea to the Karelian Isthmus. With a delay of a week, active hostilities began in the Murmansk direction of the division of the army "Norway"; June 30 in the Ukhta direction - Finnish divisions; July 1 - German and Finnish troops in the Kandalaksha direction. Two Finnish armies (15 divisions and 3 brigades) advanced on Leningrad and Petrozavodsk from the north. They were opposed by 7 of our divisions.
Fights flared up to fulfill three tasks: the capture of Lahdenpokhya, access to Lake Ladoga, the dismemberment of the Sortavala and Keksholm groupings of Soviet troops. The enemy wedged into the defense of our troops to a depth of 14-17 km, created a threat of access to Lake Ladoga, but did not complete any of the three tasks. On July 9, the enemy was stopped by our troops and was forced to go on the defensive. Only the Germans fought fiercely.
Northwestern Front
The width of the front is more than 200 km. The Wehrmacht concentrated its main efforts on the Siauliai and Vilnius directions, providing a 5-8-fold superiority. Considering the suddenness of the attack and the dispersal of the Soviet troops, the enemy began to smash the cover formations, then the main forces and, finally, the reserves.
On the first day of hostilities, the 3rd and 4th tank groups broke through the defenses of the front. On the left flank, the Germans advanced 60 km. The troops of the front were forced to hastily and disorganized retreat. Appropriate troops were thrown into battle on the move without artillery support and air cover. The troops of the 8th and 11th armies, having suffered heavy losses, continued to retreat on June 23 in divergent directions. At the junction of the Northwestern and Western fronts, a gap up to 130 km wide was formed. The enemy dominated the air. The counterattacks undertaken were not successful due to the inconsistency of actions in time and place.
The aviation of the front lost 921 aircraft in the first three days (76% of the entire fleet). The covering armies began to withdraw. By the evening of June 24, the enemy captured Kaunas and Vilnius.
The command of the North-Western Front was unable to create a defense capable of repelling the attack of the aggressor due to inept command and control, gross errors and miscalculations in assessing the situation, making decisions and executing orders, because information about the enemy was outdated and distorted. The non-stop withdrawal had a negative effect on the personnel, there was a fear of encirclement. The troops were forced to defend themselves, having no reliable logistics support, forming an army and front-line rear already in the course of hostilities. At the beginning of July 1941, due to the loss of ammunition depots, the troops had only 0.6 - 0.8 rounds of ammunition and shells.
The Red Banner Baltic Fleet found itself in a difficult position. With the capture of bases in Liepaja and Riga by the enemy, the ships moved to Tallinn, and then to Leningrad, losing more than 30% of the ships during the transitions.
Western Front
The Germans attached particular importance to the defeat of this front. He opened the way to Moscow, the capital of the enemy. This was entrusted to Army Group Center, which included 2 tank groups and 2 field armies (a total of 51 settlement divisions), with two years of combat experience. They were supposed to encircle and subsequently destroy our troops between Bialystok and Minsk. Air support was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet, which had more than 1,200 aircraft.
The troops of the Western Front, not having time to turn around, took the brunt of the Wehrmacht and suffered heavy losses on the very first day of the war. They lost 735 aircraft, of which 72% were destroyed on the ground. The enemy tanks broke through into the depths of the defense. During the first light day of the war, enemy tanks captured Kobrin and advanced into the depths of Soviet territory up to 60 km. At the junction of the Northwestern and Western fronts, they widened the gap to 130 km and by the evening of June 23 they had advanced into the depths of our territory up to 120 km.
On June 23-25, the front commander, General of the Army Pavlov, brought reserves into battle and launched counterattacks with the forces of two mechanized corps, but he could not seize the initiative from the enemy and throw him back to the border. The fights were brutal. So, in the 11th mechanized corps, out of 243 tanks, 50 remained.
On June 28, the enemy managed to cut off and encircle part of the forces of the 10th Army east of Bialystok, and on June 29, his advanced formations of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups broke into the area east of Minsk and closed the encirclement ring in which 26 divisions fought. 16 bloodless divisions held back the formations of the 3rd and 2nd German tank groups outside the encirclement.
The defeat of the troops of the Western Front led to a breakthrough of the strategic front in the Minsk direction, where a huge gap more than 400 km wide was formed in the defense of the Soviet troops. In early July, the Germans reached the Dnieper at the Novy Bykhov-Zhlobin section. On July 10, the enemy captured Vitebsk. Headquarters from the reserve transferred four armies and stopped the advance of the enemy.
Consequently, the troops of the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat in the initial period of the war. Of the 44 divisions, 24 were defeated, and the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30 to 90% of their personnel and assets.
I want to elaborate on the practical actions of our top leadership, headed by Stalin, in relation to the command of the Western Front (for more details on the materials of the case of General Pavlov, see the book "Tribunal for Heroes" Vyacheslav a Z Vyagintseva).
The most noble goal was pursued - the improvement of the front (Stalin's quote), but in reality - to shift the blame of the country's top leadership, headed by Stalin, onto the shoulders of the fighting generals and officers. Publicly, so that everyone knows and remembers!
How was it done? In short, in Stalin's way.
Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army Dmitry Grigorievich Pavlov, commander of the Western Front, was a Restored on July 4, 1941 Found guilty of inaction and surrender of entrusted military forces to the enemy. On July 22, convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court and sentenced to be shot. Sentence was carried out on the same day. Along with him, 17 more people from the command of the front and armies were shot, three shot themselves.
Stalin had to shift his own blame for the unpreparedness of the country and the armed forces for the upcoming war onto someone else's shoulders.
For this, the fabricated case had to be loud, i.e. firing squad. This is first. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the choice of the guilty, i.e. took those who were at hand. An example is the commander of the 4th army, General Korobkov. The former chief of staff of the 4th Army L. Sandalov wrote about him in his memoirs: “... according to the assignment, one army commander was intended for trial from the Western Front, and only the army commander of the 4th Army was available. The commanders of the 3rd and 10th armies were unknown where these days, and there was no communication with them. This determined the fate of Korobkov". Thirdly, we needed a reliable executor who was not afraid to shed the blood of our generals and officers. The most famous among the specialists of this profile was chief army ideologist L. 3. Mekhlis. From July 2 to 6, the commission “worked” and reported on the results:
"MOSCOW, KREMLIN, STALIN
The Military Council established the criminal activities of a number of officials, as a result of which the Western Front suffered a heavy defeat. The Military Council decided:
1) Arrest ex. Chief of Staff of the Front Klimovskikh, ex. Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Todorsky Front and Chief of Artillery of the Klich Front.
2) Put the military tribune on trial la commander of the 4th Army Korobkov, commander 9th air division Chernykh, commander of the 42nd rifle division Lazareyko, commander of the tank corps Oborin.
We ask you to approve the arrest and trial of the listed persons.
3) We have arrested Grigoriev, Head of Communications of the Front, Dorofeev, Head of the Topographic Department of the Front, Kirsanov, Head of the Department of Manning the Front, Yurov, Combat Training Inspector of the Air Force Headquarters, and Sheinkin, Head of the Military Department.
4) Berkovich, commander of the 8th disciplinary battalion, Dykman and his deputy Krol, head of the Minsk district medical warehouse Belyavsky, head of the district military veterinary laboratory Ovchinnikov, commander of the division of the artillery regiment Sbiraynik are brought to trial.
7.7-41g. Tymoshenko Mekhlis Ponomarenko".
Response came early : "Tymoshenko, Mekhlis, Ponomarenko
The State Defense Committee approves your measures to arrest Klimovsky, Oborin, Todorsky and others and welcomes these measures as one of the surest ways to improve front.
6 July1941. I. Stalin.
Pay attention to the dates. The telegram was sent on July 7, and the answer - on July 6, i.e. a day earlier. This is yet another proof of the predetermination of this issue.
"Question : Who is responsible for the breakthrough on the Western Front?
Answer: … the main reason for the rapid advance of German troops on our territory was the clear superiority of enemy aircraft and tanks. In addition, the Kuznetsovs (Baltic Military District) placed Lithuanian units on the left flank, which did not want to fight. After the first pressure on the left wing of the Baltic states, the Lithuanian units shot their commanders and fled. This made it possible for the German tank units to strike me from Vilnius.
Question: Were there traitorous actions on the part of your subordinates?
Answer: No, it wasn't. Some workers had some confusion in a rapidly changing environment.
Question: And what is your personal fault in breaking through the front?
Answer: I took all measures to prevent a German breakthrough. I do not consider myself guilty of the situation that has arisen at the front...
Question: If the main parts of the district were prepared for hostilities and you received the order to move out on time, then the deep penetration of German troops into Soviet territory can only be attributed to your criminal actions as front commander.
Answer: I categorically deny this accusation. I did not commit treason or betrayal.»
Stalin was in a hurry to rehabilitate himself, and even before the end of the investigation, on July 16, signed the resolution of the State Defense CommitteeNo. GKO-169 ss (№ 00 381). Pay attention to the two letters "ss" and two zeros in the decision number. They indicate that the document is top secret and is intended for a very narrow circle of leaders.
Despite the stamp “top secret”, this decision was announced for “information and educational purposes” in all companies, batteries, squadrons and air squadrons. The text was as follows:
“The State Defense Committee, on the proposal of the Commanders-in-Chief and commanders of fronts and armies, arrested and tried a military tribunal for dishonoring the title of commander, cowardice, inaction of the authorities, lack of command, the collapse of command and control, the surrender of weapons to the enemy without a fight and the unauthorized abandonment of military positions” of several generals and officers of the Western front, led by the commander, as well as a number of generals of the North-Western and Southern fronts.»
An analysis of the above GKO resolution allows us to conclude that Stalin did not have real information about the course of hostilities on the fronts. So, the last in the resolution is the Southern Front. Further in the text, this essay provides a description of the hostilities on the fronts, including the Southern Front. Here, very briefly, I can say that The southern front, fighting with the 11th German army, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and four Hungarian brigades successfully held them back. He was forced to retreat on the right flank in order to prevent a gap with the left flank of the Southwestern Front. The organized retreat into the depths of our territory ranged from 60 to 90 km. For comparison, by July 10, the Western Front retreated 450-600 km. Of our five fronts, the Southern Front was doing the best.
A few more words about Pavlov. He denied the allegations to the end.
In memoirs and historical studies, General Pavlov is given diametrically opposed features.
There is a popular wisdom that says that in the case of opposing opinions on one issue, the truth must be sought in the middle.
Yes, Pavlov's rapid career growth did not allow him to deeply comprehend the strategy of modern warfare and develop the practical skills of a district commander, and then a front. This is not his fault. The top leadership of the country was terribly afraid of losing power. The slightest danger from outside in this matter was eliminated under various political slogans. When such a danger arose from the side of the military, about 60 thousand marshals, generals and officers were liquidated in the case of Marshal Tukhachevsky, and 50 thousand were dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army. Went "wild" growth in the troops. This is the fault of Stalin and his clique. Pavlov came under distribution at the beginning of the war because the Western Front had the biggest losses in personnel, equipment and territory. This is not surprising. Being the commander of the district, he persistently "knocked out" in Moscow the means to create a defense in depth up to 400 km in the Belarusian military district. These funds were not given to him, because. The General Staff believed that the most likely direction of a possible offensive would be through the Kiev military district. Two systems of SDs were created here, first of all, new military equipment was given here. In addition, our military doctrine favored offensive tactics over defensive ones. The Germans collected all the information with the help of aerial reconnaissance to decide on the direction of the main attack. They hit Moscow through Belarus, which was weakly fortified in terms of military engineering, and the worse-armed troops of the Belarusian Military District. Along the entire front line, instead of offensive operations, we were forced to engage in defensive battles and breakthroughs from the encirclement.
Plus, there is a psychological factor in the officer environment as an echo of the case of Marshal Tukhachevsky. It was lawlessness on the part of the punitive authorities against any general and officer, which led to the expectation of instructions from above, the initiative was not encouraged, reports were embellished to the detriment of objectivity about the current situation. Most feared provoke by their decisions and actions an armed conflict with Germany. For this, Stalin punished very severely (an example of the People's Commissariat of Fleet Kuznetsov).
Three reasons for the defeat of the Western Front:
Prohibition to General of the Army G.P. Pavlov to carry out measures to strengthen the cover zone of the Western OVO before the start of the war, so as not to alert the Wehrmacht;
As a consequence of the first reason, the weak combat readiness of the troops of the district;
Frequent loss of control of troops due to poor radio communications.
By July 10, fascist German troops advanced to a depth of 450-600 km, captured almost all of Belarus and created the threat of a breakthrough on the move to Smolensk.
Southwestern Front
Front feature. The grouping of front troops was one and a half times larger than the advancing troops of the Wehrmacht, 58 of our divisions against 39 conditional German ones. By the number of tank and motorized - 2.7 times, 16 tank and 8 motorized of ours against 5 tank and 4 motorized German. The Germans had only 3 infantry divisions in reserve. They took a conscious risk, because. planned a flank strike away from the deployment of our main forces, which are a defense in depth.
Knowing perfectly well the location of our troops, the Germans struck with forces 13 infantry divisions at the junction between the armies, where they were opposed by 4 rifle divisions and 1 cd. On the first day, they broke through to a depth of 30 km.
The commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos, on June 23 and 24 launched two counterattacks with the forces of 3 corps and 1 sd. This did not stop the enemy. By the end of June 24, the 1st tank group of the enemy broke through to a depth of 100 km. From June 25 to June 29, the front commander launched flank attacks from the north and south with the forces of 4 mechanized corps. Frontal counterattack resulted in the largest tank battle of the initial period of the war. The offensive of the enemy tank group was delayed until the end of June. However, the troops of the front failed to eliminate the breakthrough. In practice, the counterattack turned into scattered actions of formations: some went on the attack, others completed it, and still others pulled themselves up to its line. The 8th mechanized corps, 87th and 124th rifle divisions fought in the encirclement. 2,648 tanks were lost, many due to technical breakdowns.
This made it possible by June 30, with the forces of 7 divisions from the reserve of the front, to take up defense at the turn of Lutsk - Dubno - Kremenets - Zolochiv with a length of 200 km. German air reconnaissance determined that there was an unoccupied gap between Lutsk and Dubno. 6 tank and motorized, 3 infantry divisions of the Germans went on the offensive. On July 1, the 5th Army, with the forces of 3 mechanized corps and 1 sk, launched a counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Panzer Group and detained the enemy for two days in the Rovno and Ostrog regions. The enemy, having repulsed the scattered attacks of the formations of the 5th Army, on July 6 immediately overcame the empty fortified areas of the first line, went to the Novograd-Volyn fortified area. On July 9, the Germans captured Zhytomyr and were ready to go to Kyiv in order to capture it immediately.
From the diary of Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht:
00.13. - The Commander-in-Chief called me on the phone. The Fuhrer contacted him again and expressed his extreme concern that the Panzer divisions would be sent to Kiev and suffer useless losses (in Kiev - 35% of the population are Jews; we will not be able to capture the bridges anyway), the Fuhrer does not want Panzer divisions to advance to Kiev. As an exception, this can only be done for the purpose of reconnaissance and security. The 13th SS TD went to Kyiv.
11.00. - The commander-in-chief, located at the command post of Army Group South, contacted me by phone and said that this morning he received the following telephone message from the Fuhrer:
“If it turns out to be possible to encircle any significant enemy grouping west of the Bug, then the forces of the 1st Panzer Group should be concentrated and sent to the Dnieper southeast of Kiev to encircle the city. At the same time, a strong blockade of Kyiv should be ensured in order to prevent any enemy units from the northwest from breaking into the city.
During the first 19 days of the war, the combat actions of the front resulted in the unsuccessful outcome of border battles, a retreat to the old border to a depth of 300-350 km, and a harsh suppression of an attempt to capture Kyiv on the spot. The front delayed the advance of the enemy strike force, but stopped it only near Kiev.
southern front
Active hostilities of the German-Romanian troops (German 11th, Romanian 3rd and 4th armies) began on July 2, so the troops of the front managed to enter the battles of the initial period of the war in a more organized manner than on other fronts.
The course of hostilities on the Southern Front was largely determined by the development of events on the neighboring Southwestern Front, so the command of the Southern Front kept half of the forces on the right wing: 4 Corps, 3 Rifle Division and an anti-tank brigade. Because of the fear of an enemy attack on the right flank, the front carried out a systematic withdrawal of troops, equaling its neighbor on the right, even having an advantage in tanks and aircraft.
As a result of fierce battles, the enemy wedged in the Balti and Mogilev-Podolsk directions. He concentrated the main forces against the 9th Army (7 enemy divisions in the first echelon on July 2). Against the 18th Army, the enemy command held extremely limited forces - mainly Hungarian troops, which included four brigades. Despite the more or less organized entry into the battle, the troops of the front retreated 60-90 km from July 2 to 10 on a 350-kilometer front. In the rest of the sector, the stability of the defense was maintained.
The Wehrmacht, due to the heroic resistance of the Red Army, did not fulfill the main task of the blitzkrieg. The first two weeks of fighting were carried out in accordance with the plan only in the Moscow direction and at the cost of much greater losses. Army Groups "North" and "South" thwarted it from the first days of the war. To this it should be added that the allies of the Germans entered the war late: the Norwegians on June 29, the Finns on June 30 and July 1, the Romanians on July 2.
Further successes of the Army Group Center due to the slowdown in the pace of the offensive of the Army Group " South" created a dangerous situation. This became possible as a result of the increased resistance of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. The troops of the Southwestern Front successfully held back the German divisions in the area of the middle reaches of the Dnieper. Southern front - Hungarian and Romanian divisions in the Dniester region.
Starting from the third week of the war, the right flank of the German group in the direction of Moscow exposed more and more, tk. she was advancing faster than her neighbor on the right. The danger of a strategic flank attack by Soviet troops from the south increased. True, for this, reserves were needed for the Southwestern Front, but the available reserves of the Red Army have so far been fettered by the Japanese in the Far East and the British in the region of the Caucasian oil fields .
According to Soviet military historians, since July 7, the Kiev defensive operation has become a strategic one, because. more and more chained the German troops to itself, the right flank of the Germans in the Moscow direction became more and more vulnerable.
July 29, 1941 Zhukov G.K. was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and appointed commander of the Reserve Front. Zhukov was well aware that he was put on the list of "penalties" for the loss of command and control in the early days of the war and would be periodically tested for loyalty to the Leader. He had only two ways - either his chest in crosses, or his head in the bushes. Zhukov chose the first path. Saving his life, he strictly followed all Stalin's instructions, not looking at the losses in personnel. Participants of the Great Patriotic War deservedly awarded him the name "The Bloodiest Marshal of the War."
Hitler decided not to risk it. When the right flank of the Central Group of German Forces in the Moscow direction was dangerously exposed, the Fuhrer was forced to suspend the attack on Moscow and from August 19 to begin the transfer of the troops of the Center group to the south.
The attack on Moscow was suspended for almost a month and a half.
Until now, a number of military historians, especially Germans, have an opinion that the failure of the blitzkrieg was due to the fact that Hitler gave preference to the economic component of the Barbarossa plan - to capture Ukrainian grain harvested in 1941, coal from Donbass, ore from Krivoy Rog, machine-building complexes of Ukraine and much more.
You are wrong, gentlemen! Hitler did not give preference to the economic component, but he was forced to save the military component of the Barbarossa plan!
Seventy years have passed. From today's position, we can more objectively assess past events. The soldiers of the Southwestern Front in 1941 inflicted irreparable damage on the Germans, holding back the advance of the German armies. The defense of Kyiv slowed down the German offensive in the south, and at that time the Wehrmacht stubbornly rushed to Moscow. As a result, by mid-August, the southern flank of Army Group Center, which was advancing on Moscow, was dangerously exposed. A flank attack by Soviet troops from the Southwestern Front would lead to a strategic encirclement of German troops in the Moscow direction. Hitler noticed this first.
From the standpoint of the classical German strategy, the bloody heroic defense of Kyiv made sense only in the case of preparing a flank attack by Soviet troops from the south against the rear of the German Moscow group. This would put an end to the German blitz victory in this war. This is the ABC of military strategy.
By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of August 19, the 40th and 38th armies of the Southwestern Front crossed with battles to the left bank of the Dnieper. German air reconnaissance recorded this.
Hitler reacted instantly. The Fuhrer, in his two directives of August 19 and 21, changed the plan of hostilities on the Eastern Front - he canceled the attack on Moscow and set the task of eliminating the threat from the left flank of the Southwestern Front. To do this, he removes the 2nd Army and the 2nd Tank Group under the command of Guderian from the Central Strategic Direction from the Novozybkov area. They received an order and launched an offensive in the direction of Konotop and Chernigov in order to reach the rear of the Southwestern Front.
Consequently, the stubborn resistance of the defenders of Kyiv and the Southwestern Front forced the Fuhrer to temporarily change the strategy of the war. He suspended the attack on Moscow and transferred troops to the Kiev direction against the Southwestern Front. The Kiev operation broke the strategy of the fascist "blitzkrieg".
On September 10, Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny sent a telegram to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command justifying the need to withdraw troops from Kyiv so that they would not be surrounded. I did it decisively without fear of the consequences.
September 11 Marshal S.M. Budyonny on the apparatus of BODO, talking personally with Stalin, insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops. Stalin ordered:
"Do not leave Kyiv and do not blow up bridges without special permission from the Headquarters."
On the night of September 12, Stalin personally spoke with Kirponos on the BODO apparatus and "squeezed out" the words he needed from him: request, in connection with the expanded front to more than eight hundred kilometers, to strengthen our front with reserves. Stalin got his way.
September 13 Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Kirponos and Vasilevsky again insisted on the immediate withdrawal of troops from Kyiv. On the same day, the restless Budyonny was removed from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction.
Having no reserves, the Southwestern Front could not stop the advance to its rear from the south of the 1st Panzer Group under the command of Ewald von Kleist, and from the north - the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian, who joined on September 15 in the Lokhvitsa area.
The armies of the Southwestern Front fell into the operational encirclement: the 5th, 21st (transferred from the Bryansk Front), 26th and 37th (defending Kyiv).
Stalin sent a plane for Kirponos. Everyone understood that his arrival in Moscow would end in execution, as two months ago with General Pavlov. By order of Kirponos, a wounded soldier was put on the plane. In the situation that had arisen, he could not go out to his own people and could not surrender to the Germans. He chose death in battle (author's opinion). On September 20, the commander with a rifle in his hands led the officers and soldiers in a bayonet attack. Was wounded in the leg. At about 18.30, while discussing options for a night breakthrough, he was wounded in the chest and head by fragments of a German mine. He died two minutes later.
By September 26, 1941, the Germans crushed the main centers of resistance of the front troops. The army commander of the 37th army, General Vlasov, came out with battles to his own. Was immediately hospitalized.
In the Moscow direction in early October, it got colder and heavy autumn rains began. Brought our famous roads. The German tracked vehicles had become, they could not move on such impassability. The Germans understood what our word "thaw" means.
Involuntarily, a question arises.
1. Why did Stalin not allow the evacuation of troops from Kyiv for so long?
2. Then he built a "lure" for Hitler, which cost a lot of losses?
Stalin immediately killed two "political hares".
1. A blitzkrieg was disrupted.
2. The issue of American Lend-Lease was resolved positively.
Stalin almost got US President Roosevelt to agree to the supply of weapons under Lend-Lease, his own was already sorely lacking. A dispute broke out in the United States: is it worth helping Soviet Russia with weapons? The arguments were serious - it makes no sense to send equipment, because. Russia will collapse by winter, Hitler will win and the weapons will fall to him.
Roosevelt decided to make sure that Stalin stood firm, and in August sent his assistant G. Hopkins to Russia for reconnaissance. He carefully familiarized himself with the situation in the country and at the front. At a farewell conversation, he posed the question point-blank: where will the front line be drawn by the winter of 1941/42? He personally had to convey the answer to this question to Roosevelt. Stalin replied that the front would pass west of Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.
So, Kyiv became a hostage of the promise of the Leader of the Peoples to the President of the United States.
Therefore, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command allowed Kyiv to leave only on September 18, when for three days with the troops of the 37th army of General A. Vlasov he was completely surrounded.
In the German press, the stoppage of the offensive against Moscow was presented as the Fuhrer's concern for the fatherland: to feed the German people with the Ukrainian grain of the 1941 harvest, and the industry with coal and the best iron ore in Europe. Some of our historians picked up this idea as the true reason for stopping the offensive against Moscow.
You are wrong, gentlemen. This is not a cause, but a consequence.
According to the Barbarossa plan, German troops were supposed to reach the line that day: Arkhangelsk - Volga - Astrakhan. Reality was different. Leningrad and Odessa successfully fought in the siege. The troops left Kyiv, which they defended for two and a half months and broke through to the east. A week ago, bloody battles ended in the Smolensk direction. As a result of the Kyiv and Smolensk operations, the Soviet command gained time to prepare the defense of Moscow. The battles in the Far North and in Karelia were tense.
The pace of the German offensive dropped to 2 km per day.
conclusions
1. The suddenness of the attack on June 22, 1941 is the result of the loss of the leadership of the USSR to fascist Germany in open and secret diplomacy in the pre-war period.
2. The effectiveness of the German offensive at the beginning of the war is due to the weakness of the country's top leadership, which lost control over the course of hostilities for almost a decade, and the military leadership, which fights not with the mind, but with the number of dead Red Army soldiers. This is a consequence of mass repressions and purges in the Red Army before the war.
3. For the first three weeks of the war, the loss ratio was 10.3:1, not in our favor. We lost half of the tanks, aircraft and artillery, but on four fronts thwarted the blitzkrieg plan. Only in the Moscow direction were the Germans able to maintain the pace of the offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan during the first two weeks of the war.
3. The Kiev strategic defensive operation (July 7 - September 25, 1941) stopped the German offensive in the Southwestern Front, which created a threat to the right flank of the Germans in the Moscow direction. Hitler canceled the attack on Moscow. The liberated troops struck at the rear of the Southwestern Front.
4. On September 22, 1941, the term of the Barbarossa plan ended. Its implementation failed: Leningrad was fighting, Moscow was intensively preparing for defense, after the surrender of Kyiv, fierce battles unfolded in Left-Bank Ukraine. The Volga was still very far away.
5. Specifically, he saved Moscow at the end of August and gave September to prepare for defense - the Southwestern Front. Stalin consciously donated. The "Kiev price" of saving Moscow is more than 700 thousand people.
6. In November 1941, the USSR was officially included in the list of Lend-Lease countries.
7. On May 25, 1945, Stalin, in his famous toast on the occasion of the Victory, said: "... we had mistakes, for the first two years our army was forced to retreat, it turned out that they did not master the events, did not cope with the situation."
He was the first to talk about the mistakes, but did not talk about the reasons. They were:
violence and terror against the "internal enemy", "hostile" national minorities, dissidents, all military personnel who were captured, who were classified as traitors to the motherland and etc.At dawn on June 22, one of the longest days of the year, Germany began the war against the Soviet Union. At 0330 hours, units of the Red Army were attacked by German troops along the entire length of the border. An hour after the start of the invasion, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Count von Schulenburg, handed a memorandum to V. Molotov. It said that the Soviet government wanted to "stab Germany in the back", and therefore "the Führer gave the order to the Wehrmacht to prevent this threat with all forces and means." "Is this a declaration of war?" Molotov asked. Schulenburg spread his hands. “What did we do to deserve this?!” Molotov exclaimed bitterly. On the morning of June 22, Moscow radio broadcast the usual Sunday programs and peaceful music. Soviet citizens learned about the beginning of the war only at noon, when Vyacheslav Molotov spoke on the radio. He said: "Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without presenting any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their aircraft." “This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking arrogant enemy,” Molotov continued. - At one time, our people responded to Napoleon's campaign in Russia with the Patriotic War, and Napoleon was defeated, came to his collapse. The same will happen with the arrogant Hitler ... ". Molotov called for a "patriotic war for the Motherland, for honor, for freedom." He concluded his speech with the famous words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".
On June 22, German Colonel-General F. Halder (Chief of the German General Staff) wrote in his official diary: “The offensive of our troops was a complete surprise for the enemy. The units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood on the airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the advanced units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command what to do. But already a week after the start of hostilities, he wrote in his diary: “The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from the statutory principles: now this is already unacceptable.
The first battles on the border. Heroic resistance and the first heroes.
At the beginning of the war, when most of the Soviet troops retreated in disarray, there were already isolated cases of stubborn resistance. The most famous of them is the defense of the Brest Fortress. The small garrison of the fortress, led by Major P. Gavrilov, was besieged by the enemy. The soldiers did not have enough food, water, ammunition. But despite this, for long weeks, until mid-July, they continued to defend themselves. “I am dying, but I am not giving up,” one of the defenders of the fortress wrote in blood on the stone. The feat of Captain N. Gastello became known to the whole country. On the fifth day of the war, during the fighting near Minsk, he sent his wrecked and on fire plane to a column of German tanks. Gastello died, as did the members of his crew.
On June 22, the Germans destroyed more than 1200 Soviet aircraft, most of them on the ground. Thus, they secured complete air supremacy. In just the first hundred days of the war, the Red Army lost 96% of aviation - more than 8 thousand aircraft. The draft Soviet Field Manual of 1939 stated: “If the enemy imposes war on us, the Red Army will be the most attacking of all the attacking armies ever. We will conduct the war offensively, transferring it to the territory of the enemy. “And on enemy land we will defeat the enemy, with little blood, with a mighty blow!” - V. Lebedev-Kumach echoed in verse. In the first days of the war, the Soviet leadership tried to follow these guidelines. On the evening of June 22, a directive was sent to the troops to launch a "counteroffensive with access to enemy territory." "By the end of June 24" it was required to "take control of the Lublin region."
Attempts to comply with this order only worsened the situation. “Unimaginable chaos has gripped the Russian armies,” the reports of the Verkhovna Rada reported on July 2. The Germans took in "pincers" (surrounded) and destroyed entire Soviet armies. Two armies were surrounded near Bialystok and Minsk. More than 320 thousand people were taken prisoner. On June 28, the Germans took Minsk. Fear of encirclement, as Marshal K. Rokossovsky recalled, "was a real scourge." It was worth hearing the cries of "Bypass!" or “Surrounded!” as the disorderly flight of the troops began. On July 3, General F. Halder noted in his diary: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days."
On this day, for the first time after the start of the war, I. Stalin addressed the Soviet citizens. He began his speech on the radio with a completely unusual address: “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I turn to you, my friends! After the soothing newspaper reports on the course of hostilities, for the first time people realized the extent of the danger. Stalin said that the enemy had captured vast territories - Lithuania, part of Ukraine and Belarus. “The enemy is cruel and implacable,” said Stalin. “He sets as his goal the capture of our lands, watered with our sweat, the capture of our bread and our oil, obtained by our labor. It sets as its goal the destruction of the national culture and national statehood of the free peoples of the Soviet Union, their Germanization, their transformation into slaves of German princes and barons. The point is, therefore, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement. Stalin called for "an all-people Patriotic war against the fascist oppressors."
In terms of intensity, scope, military-political and strategic results, the Battle of Moscow is one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War. By the nature of the tasks solved by the Soviet troops, it includes the Moscow Strategic Defensive Operation and the Moscow Strategic Offensive Operation.
The Moscow strategic defensive operation was carried out with September 30 to December 5, 1941 of the year with the aim of defending Moscow and defeating the German troops of the Army Group Center advancing on it by the troops of the Western, Reserve, Bryansk and Kalinin fronts. The fighting during this operation unfolded on the front of 700-1110 km.
The German command connected the success of the entire Eastern campaign of the Wehrmacht with the capture of Moscow. To achieve these goals, Army Group Center was significantly strengthened.
Three Soviet front formations opposed the enemy 350-550 km from Moscow in a strip of 730 km: the Western Front (commander Colonel General I.S. Konev), the Reserve Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny) and the Bryansk Front (commander Colonel General A.I. Eremenko).
Army Group Center outnumbered the opposing Soviet troops by 1.4 times in men, 1.8 times in guns and mortars, 1.7 times in tanks, and 2 times in combat aircraft. This largely predetermined the initial success of the German offensive.
Operation Typhoon has begun September 30, 1941 of the year by the offensive of the 2nd German tank group against the troops of the Bryansk Front.
For the second attack on Moscow, the enemy pulled up reserves and aimed 51 divisions at the capital, including 13 tank and 7 motorized. The superiority in enemy forces was: in people - 3.5 times, in artillery and mortars - 4.5 times, in tanks almost 2 times. Only in aviation was the enemy inferior to the Red Army. On the Volokolamsk and Tula directions, the superiority of the enemy was even greater.
By decision of the Soviet government November 7, 1941 year, it was decided to hold a parade on Red Square.
In the course of a two-month battle on the outskirts of Moscow, the fascist German group was deprived of offensive capabilities. Operation Typhoon is in crisis. The second "general" German offensive against Moscow was stopped. The initiative in hostilities began to pass to the Soviet troops. The Moscow strategic offensive operation was carried out with December 5, 1941 to January 7, 1942 in order to defeat the troops of the Army Group Center, which by the beginning of December 1941 numbered 1 million 708 thousand people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft. It outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel by 1.5 times, in artillery - by 1.8 times, in tanks - by 1.5 times, and only in aircraft was inferior to them by 1.6 times.
The Soviet grouping near Moscow (Western, Kalinin, Southwestern and Bryansk fronts), having made up for losses by this time due to the reserves being formed, had 1 million 100 thousand people, 7652 guns and mortars, 774 tanks and 1000 aircraft. When planning a counteroffensive, the Soviet command took into account not only the balance of forces, but also other factors: the exhaustion of the German troops, their lack of pre-prepared defensive positions, their unpreparedness for warfare in harsh winter conditions, and the high morale of the Soviet soldiers.
By January 7, 1942 the advancing Soviet troops liberated over 11 thousand settlements from the invaders, incl. the cities of Kalinin and Kaluga, eliminated the danger of the encirclement of Tula, reached the line of Selizharovo - Rzhev - the Lama River - Ruza - Borovsk - Mosalsk - Belev - Verkhovye, throwing the enemy 100 - 250 km from Moscow. A heavy defeat was inflicted on 38 enemy divisions, including 15 tank and motorized.
What is the significance of the defeat of the army of Nazi Germany near Moscow?
Firstly, here Hitler's plan of "lightning war" (blitzkrieg) against the USSR, which was successful on the battlefields in Western Europe, finally collapsed. During the battle, the best strike formations of the largest enemy grouping, the Center Army Group, which was the color and pride of the Nazi army, were defeated.
Secondly, the first major defeat of the Nazi army in World War II was inflicted near Moscow, dispelling the myth of its invincibility, which had a great influence on the entire further course of the war. The Red Army wrested from the enemy during this period the strategic initiative, which he had owned for two years, and created the conditions for going on the general offensive, forced the German troops to go on the Soviet-German front - the main front of the war - to strategic defense, put Germany in front of the prospect protracted war, for which she was not ready.
This indisputable truth was forced to be recognized by both the allies in the fight against fascist aggression and the enemies of the Soviet Union.
Third, the defeat of the German troops near Moscow dealt a blow to the morale of the soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, undermined the faith of the Nazis in the successful outcome of the aggression. It was in the Battle of Moscow that the role of the moral and psychological factor in defeating the enemy was most clearly revealed. In this battle, Soviet soldiers clearly demonstrated high patriotic consciousness, loyalty to military duty, courage, heroism, readiness to endure the hardships and hardships of war, the ability not to get lost in the most dangerous and difficult battle conditions, to overcome tank and aircraft fears, to fight against superior forces. enemy, etc.
The whole country admired the unparalleled exploits of the Panfilov heroes, divisions of the people's militia, and naval brigades. For valor and courage, many formations and units of the ground forces, three air regiments of the Western Front were transformed into guards.
In total, in the battle for Moscow, 110 especially distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Fourth, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Moscow was of great military-political and international significance. The victory of the Red Army near Moscow raised the prestige of the Soviet Union even higher and was an inspiring stimulus for the entire Soviet people in their further struggle against the aggressor. This victory contributed to the strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition, aggravated the contradictions within the Hitler bloc, and forced the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey to refrain from entering the war on the side of Germany. It removed the threat of a German invasion of England and activated the liberation movement of the peoples of Europe against Hitler's tyranny.
Since the defenders of the cities of Yelets, Dmitrov, Naro-Fominsk, Kozelsk, Volokolamsk showed courage, steadfastness and mass heroism in the battle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decree of the President of Russia, these cities were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory".
