Science as a form of knowledge. Features of scientific knowledge. Science and philosophy, science and art. Science and everyday knowledge Signs of science as a form of knowledge

ABSTRACT ON PHILOSOPHY

on the topic:

SCIENCE AS A SPECIAL FORM OF KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY

Completed by: Lieutenant Timakov D.S.

Tver 2006

Introduction

This work is devoted to one of the many problems of philosophy, namely: science as a form of knowledge of reality. Here we will describe various approaches to understanding this problem in different years, as well as the properties and functions of science as they were seen by people at different stages of the development of society.

The first part is devoted to the consideration of science as a system that has its own properties and functions. Next, questions of the specificity and generality of cognition will be considered both by individual groups of people and by society as a whole.

The third part will describe scientific truth as a social phenomenon. The fourth part presents the basic universal principles and general scientific methods of cognition and their description.

In the final, fifth, part, the dynamics of the development of worldviews of an opposite nature will be briefly examined: the view of science as an integral part of the culture of a developing society and the view of this problem from opponents of solving cultural issues using scientific methods.

1. Systematicity of the phenomenon of science

Science is a specific form of activity (both in theoretical and practical spheres) associated with the formation of relatively objective, systematic and proven knowledge about spiritual and material reality.

Science is one of the defining subsystems of culture. By the beginning of the 21st century. there are more than 800 of its definitions, because every major scientist (thinker) gives his own interpretation of the phenomenon of science.

If you clarify this enough general definition, then several areas of scientific activity should be identified that would specify it. Namely:

– identification of not external, but essential characteristics of reality;

– formation of a logically consistent system of knowledge about the objective picture of the world;

– forecasting the state of real objects and processes based on identified natural and social laws;

– creation and development of special means of cognitive activity (mathematical methods, research equipment, etc.);

– the spread of a special type of professional activity (scientists, engineers, etc.) in the sphere of social division of labor;

– the functioning of a special system of organizations and institutions involved in the acquisition, storage, dissemination and implementation of acquired knowledge (libraries, information centers, etc.).

The terms “science” and “scientist” arose in the first half of the 19th century. in European university practice. They designated activities in the field of mathematics, physics, chemistry and other natural sciences. The term “social science” was later used for activities in the field of social sciences.

In the process of the genesis and development of scientific knowledge, attention to its classification increased. Let us note some milestones in this process.

The first classifications of science arose in the era of antiquity. Aristotle (384-422 BC) divided philosophy (as a single science) into “theoretical philosophy”, “practical philosophy” and “creative philosophy”. Moreover, he divides “theoretical philosophy” into physical, mathematical and theological philosophy; on poetics and rhetoric. Logic is interpreted as a propaedeutic (introduction) to the entire system of sciences.

In modern times, F. Bacon (1561-1626) developed a classification of sciences based on contemporary material. Human knowledge was divided into three areas (spheres), namely: history (memory), poetry (fantasy) and philosophy (reason). At the same time, the identified areas of knowledge were subjected to further detail.

Representatives of the French Enlightenment (Diderot, 1713-1784; etc.) within the framework of the “Encyclopedia, or Explanatory dictionary sciences, arts and crafts,” highlighted mechanics, physics, chemistry, physiology, etc.

A. de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) proposed classifications of sciences by analogy with class structure society (slave and feudal society - theology, capitalism - positivism, etc.).

O. Comte (1798-1857) developed the doctrine of “three stages” of the development of science, namely: theological, metaphysical and positive. Moreover, each of the known sciences sequentially goes through, in his opinion, the marked stages. Not only the natural sciences (astronomy, physics, biology, etc.), but also the humanities—sociology—go through the corresponding stages.

The fundamental classification of science (philosophy) was proposed by Hegel (1770-1831). Namely: “real philosophy” is divided by him into “philosophy of nature” and “philosophy of spirit”. “Philosophy of Nature” includes mechanics, physics, organic physics. “Philosophy of spirit” is divided into “subjective spirit” (anthropology, phenomenology, psychology), “objective spirit” (law, morality, ethics) and “absolute spirit” (art, religion, philosophy).

By the 20th century, the following system of sciences had developed:

– natural science (natural sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about nature;

– technical knowledge (technical sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about technical systems; sciences focused on the implementation of natural science knowledge;

– human studies (social and human sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about man and society and the socio-cultural environment of his habitat.

In this case we are talking about the “horizontal” dimension of the phenomenon of science. Within the framework of the “vertical” dimension, sciences are distinguished fundamental and applied.

Fundamental sciences are a system of knowledge about the deepest properties of objective reality, associated with the formation of a scientific picture of the world, which, as a rule, does not have a practical orientation. Applied sciences, on the contrary, are considered as a system of knowledge that has a pronounced subject-practical orientation.

Fundamental sciences are associated with identifying the basic patterns and principles of the development of nature. Traditional research at this level is carried out not due to external (social) needs, but due to internal (immanent) incentives. Therefore, fundamental sciences do not have a clearly defined practical orientation. In this sense, axiological (value) neutrality is associated with them. At the same time, discoveries in the fundamental sciences have a fundamental impact on the formation of the natural science picture of the world, changing the paradigm (main characteristics) of scientific thinking. It is in the fundamental sciences that basic models of cognition are developed, concepts, principles and laws that form the foundations of applied sciences are identified.

Applied sciences, based on the results of fundamental research, focus on solving specific technical and technological problems related to the interests of society. Sciences at this level are ambivalent, i.e. Depending on the area of application, they can be used both for the benefit of a person and have a negative impact on him and his environment. In other words, applied sciences also include value content.

On the one hand, the range of ideas, theories and concepts coming from the field of fundamental sciences to the field of applied research leads to the transformation of applied sciences. This circumstance, in turn, requires the “fundamentalization” of applied sciences. On the other hand, applied sciences actively influence fundamental sciences, increasing the degree of their “practicalization”.

Firstly, the means and methods of instrumental knowledge of nature are being improved. And, secondly, when developing applied problems, new ideas and methods often arise. Thus, the development of technology for accelerating elementary particles has made it possible to substantiate and test theoretical ideas about the fundamental laws of the microworld. Moreover, relevant research has led to the discovery of new elementary particles and the identification of patterns of their formation, which has significantly advanced the understanding of the deep processes of the microworld that determine the evolution of the Universe.

The development of science is an objective process, which is characterized by an orientation towards internal immanent (from the Latin immanentis - characteristic, inherent) conditions. The formation of natural science, technical knowledge and human knowledge increasingly reveals its historical dependence on external conditions (social, economic, cultural, etc.).

In other words, the process of interconnection and interaction of sciences is intensifying. Historically, several forms of interrelation and interaction between various scientific disciplines have been identified. Let us designate some levels of integrativeness of science.

Adjacent integrativeness. The relationship of scientific disciplines genetically and historically interacting with each other (physical chemistry, biophysics, economic mathematics, etc.)

Intercontiguous integrativity. The interrelation of scientific disciplines, both of one cycle (natural science) and interrelated ones (for example, bionics is based not only on biology and physics, but also on technical sciences).

Targeted integrativeness. The interaction of scientific disciplines of various cycles and profiles is carried out to implement the target setting corresponding to a particular science (for example, cybernetics combines not only mathematics or biology, but also systems theory, management methodology, sociology, etc.).

Problematic integrativeness. The interrelation of various areas of scientific knowledge occurs in the process of solving a specific problem; the degree of integrativeness is a function of its level - from local to global (for example, solving a global environmental problem requires the “involvement” of all areas of natural science, technical knowledge and human science).

These trends in science also correlate with its functions. Several functions of science are noted. Let's highlight some of them, namely: research, teaching, communication, sociocultural and ideological.

Research function. Science, studying a specific reality, discovers its new sides and qualities, reveals more and more effective methods of cognition, etc. The purpose of scientific research is to analyze the patterns of objective reality.

Educational function. Within its framework, the reproduction of scientific knowledge is carried out - the transfer of scientific ideas from one research system to another. This is carried out in the process of training scientific personnel (through the education system, scientific schools, etc.), which ensures the continuity of the development of science, as well as the formation of new scientific traditions.

Communication function. This is a process of information exchange between members of the scientific community, which includes publications, conferences, discussions, etc. As a result, the relationship of the scientific community is strengthened, awareness and efficiency of research activities are increased.

Sociocultural function. Science is one of the basic elements of culture that forms the basis of civilization. The level and nature of the development of science is a significant factor that fixes the status of society in the dynamics of the historical process. The development of science is a criterion for the positive dynamism of civilization.

Worldview function. The overall development of science forms the foundations of a scientific worldview, that is, a system of principles, beliefs and ideas that determine a holistic approach to objective reality. In an extremely generalized form, the scientific worldview is associated with the rational attitude of man (subject) to nature (object).

At various stages of social development, certain functions of science dominated. For example, in the ancient period the emphasis was placed on its ideological functions (spontaneously dialectical form of worldview); in the medieval period - the teaching function (during this period science was concentrated mainly in universities); in the conditions of modern times, the research function of science developed (the formation of a modern type of scientific knowledge).

Until the 19th century the development of science was predominantly immanent in nature, without having a significant impact on the sociocultural processes of reality. And only by the middle of the 20th century the functions of science appear in unity, forming a systemic integrity that ensures the dynamism of the cognitive process.

2. Natural science and sociocultural knowledge: specificity and generality

Historically, two points of view have developed on the specifics of natural science (technical knowledge) and human science (social and humanitarian knowledge). The first of them comes from the fact that there is a pronounced specificity between natural science and human science, determined by the type of natural science and humanities knowledge. The second point of view, on the contrary, is based on ideas according to which there are no fundamental differences between natural science and humanitarian knowledge.

I. Kant (1724-1804) stands at the origins of views based on the essential difference between the “history of nature” and the “history of society.” In his opinion, if “unconscious forces” operate in nature, then in society there are people “striving for certain goals "

The neo-Kantian (Baden) school, based on Kant’s teaching, actively developed the thesis about the opposition of natural science and sociocultural knowledge.

G. Rickert (1863-1936) divided the sciences, based on the level of abstraction used within their framework, into generalizing disciplines (natural sciences) and individualizing disciplines (historical sciences). Therefore, in his opinion, in natural science it is possible to reach the level of comprehensive concepts and laws, while historical (sociocultural) disciplines are oriented primarily towards an individualistic vision of reality. Moreover, the desire to reach a generalizing (generalizing) understanding historical processes turns into their distortion.

Historically, a number of features of natural science and sociocultural knowledge have been identified, conditioned by the reality of their specific characteristics. Let's note some of them.

The basis of knowledge of the laws of nature is the cause-and-effect relationship of natural things and phenomena. Moreover, natural patterns do not depend on human activity. The laws of mechanics, for example, are objective in nature, explaining the specifics of the relationships of bodies in the macrocosm.

On the contrary, the laws of functioning of sociocultural systems are a function of the activities of society, because they change as a result of sociocultural development. Therefore, sociocultural patterns are not a constant category.

Of course, the laws of nature, revealed within the framework of natural science, lose their constancy in the process of cognition. The discovery of the microworld revealed the limitation of the laws of mechanics to the sphere of the macroworld. At the same time, sociocultural patterns are largely normative in nature, having a large degree of subjectivity.

So, natural sciences are characterized by a high degree of objectivity, because their development is associated with the desire to identify internal natural connections and relationships. Historical disciplines also strive to identify objective trends in the development of social systems. Within their framework, however, the dominance of target and normative ideas is more clearly visible.

The laws of natural science are revealed on the basis of scientific experiment. Moreover, any theoretical position in a particular science of nature requires experimental confirmation. The situation is different in the social sciences. Within their framework, experiment (as an active influence on a cognizable object in the natural scientific sense) is hardly possible.

Natural scientific regularities receive the status of law when the process of experimentation succeeds in ensuring their repeatability. A historical fact is a single phenomenon. In this sense, any sociocultural phenomenon is unique in its existing historical forms. Consequently, the cognitive process in natural science and human science is based on opposing methodological principles.

The specific features of the object of natural science and human science also affect the effectiveness of forecasting the development of natural (natural) and socio-natural (integral) systems. The truth of the natural science theory is confirmed not only by experiment, but also by the constructiveness of the forecast, i.e. the possibility of long-term extrapolation of the development of a specific natural system. If molecular hydrogen and oxygen are involved in a chemical reaction, then the prognosis is obvious, namely: the process will end with the formation of a molecule. Similar forecasting efficiency is hardly possible in the social sciences. In other words, forecasting in social and humanitarian knowledge (as opposed to natural science and technical knowledge) is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty.

Historically, natural science knowledge took shape in the form of a scientific theory before the system of sciences about man and society took shape.

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the divide between the natural sciences and the humanities is increasingly arbitrary. Let us point out two circumstances that at least confirm this thesis.

Firstly, the scale of the problems (“challenges”) that require adequate resolution within the framework of modern civilization requires the “connection” of the entire cycle of scientific knowledge. And if in the process of formation and development the status of natural science was extremely high (and human science could not compete with it), then by the middle of the 20th century. the sciences of the social and humanitarian cycle have, to a certain extent, “pushed out” disciplines of a natural science nature (the development of economics, psychology, anthropology, social philosophy, etc.). An adequate “answer” to the challenges of civilization can only be obtained through the process of interconnection and interaction of various branches of modern scientific knowledge.

And, secondly, the methods of natural science (and technical science) and human science are gradually moving closer together. If previously, for example, a scientific experiment was related primarily to natural science, then with the development of, say, global modeling, social sciences are able to “play out” certain situations in the development of society. As a result, the objectivity of social cognition increases, as well as the effectiveness of its predictive constructs. The phenomenon of the “information revolution” is steadily overcoming the traditional dichotomy between natural science and human science. At the same time, differences between them, due to the specifics of the object of study, remain to one degree or another. Man and nature, rushing towards each other, nevertheless retain their specificity.

3. Scientific truth as a sociocultural phenomenon

The concept of truth is one of the defining ones in the theory of knowledge. Truth is an adequate reflection of reality, its comprehension. There are diametrically opposed points of view regarding the possibility of knowing objective reality.

Supporters of one point of view proceed from the fact that, despite the complexity and inconsistency, reality as a whole is knowable; on the contrary, others - those who adhere to agnosticism - reject completely (or partially) the possibility of knowing the world. Elements of agnosticism, given the complexity of the cognitive process, persist in modern sociocultural conditions.

Different forms of truth are recorded (artistic, moral, political, etc.), corresponding to specific types of knowledge (aesthetics, ethics, politics, etc.). Scientific truth has a special status.

The following criteria of scientific truth are identified, which are interconnected. Namely:

–objectivity – independence from external factors;

– systematic – the use of a set of principles, theories, hypotheses, etc.;

–rational evidence—reliance on logical experimental grounds;

– the possibility of verifiability – at the experimental and practical level.

The search for scientific truth is an evolutionary process. Reaching the level of objective scientific truth, i.e., obtaining knowledge that does not depend on subjective conditions, is associated with the “gradation” of the cognitive process.

How to separate true knowledge from untrue? In other words, how to distinguish true knowledge from error in its most diverse manifestations?

The search for an answer to this question has been going on since the genesis of scientific knowledge. Various characteristics were taken as a criterion for true knowledge, namely: self-evidence, observability, clarity, etc. In the 19th-20th centuries. Several principles have emerged, the consideration of which presupposes reaching the level of true knowledge. Let's highlight some of them.

Principle“practice is the criterion of truth.” Practice is understood as the purposeful objective-sensory activity of a subject (person) to transform an object (surrounding reality). Scientific practice involves experimental activities related to the implementation of the provisions of a theory, thereby confirming its truth or falsity. However, this principle does not mean an absolutization of the status of a practitioner in the cognitive process: only in the process of interrelation between practice and science (theory) is the truth of scientific concepts revealed.

Verification principle. In accordance with the views of positivism, the truth of any statement about the objects and processes of reality is established, ultimately, by comparing it (the truth) with sensory data. The difficulty (and often the impossibility) of “touching” directly the objects of scientific research (for example, the microworld) led neopositivists (logical positivism) to the thesis of partial and experimental indirect confirmation of the theory. This establishes a relationship between theoretical and experimental positions as a criterion for the truth of knowledge.

The principle of falsification. In accordance with this principle, only those statements that can, in principle, be falsified, that is, refuted in the process of comparison with empirical data, have the status of scientific nature. In this case, the emphasis is on a critical approach to the results of theoretical research.

The principle of rationalism. This is the ideal of philosophical classical ideas about true science. According to these ideas, reliable knowledge (universality, simplicity, predictability, etc. is associated with it) can only be obtained on the basis of logical constructions. Taking a critical approach to classical ideas about the scientific nature of knowledge, modern postpositivists reject a unified theory of rationality based on “historical relativism.” Within its framework, the concept of rational knowledge changes historically, including characteristics (for example, intuition) not accepted by classical rationalism.

Differentiating true knowledge from false knowledge is not so easy. It is not always possible to set up an experiment, to conduct an experimental test of the relevant theoretical provisions, especially in the social sciences and humanities.

M. Polanyi (1891-1976) formulated a theory according to which there are two types of knowledge. Namely: explicit knowledge expressed in categories, concepts, laws, theoretical constructs, etc.; tacit knowledge that does not have a clear theoretical apparatus, recorded primarily in practical actions (skills, mastery, etc.).

Scientific truth is a balance between explicit and implicit knowledge. And if in natural science (and technical science) there is a large degree of explicit knowledge, then, on the contrary, in human science there is a large degree of implicit knowledge. Approaching scientific truth presupposes the “translation” of an increasingly significant part of knowledge from its implicit to its explicit form. This is a dynamic process determined by the historical and sociocultural conditions of the development of science.

4. Universal principles and general scientific methods of cognition

Universal principles are mental techniques used in all spheres of cognitive activity, in the system of natural, technical and human sciences. We will indicate only a few of them.

The principle of objectivity. The desire to consider an object (phenomenon, thing or process) based on internal (immanent) ideas.

Development principle. The idea according to which change, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of a thing, phenomenon or process is its internal property.

Development is inherent in both organic and inorganic objects, as well as sociocultural systems. Various types of development are distinguished. Namely: ascending and descending, progressive and regressive, from higher to lower, from simple to complex, from necessary to accidental, etc.

Systematic principle. An analysis of a thing, phenomenon or process in the unity, interaction and interrelation of all their elements is assumed; consideration of system elements as a whole.

Systematicity– the desire for the comprehensiveness of the cognitive process, which is interpreted as an epistemological ideal. One of the features of systematicity is the interrelation of the formalized and informal means and methods used in it for studying objects of various levels studied by the natural, technical and human sciences.

The universal principles of scientific knowledge (some of them are discussed above) are specified within the framework general scientific methods. Let's highlight a number of them.

Induction and deduction. They are based on the relationship between discreteness (separateness) and integrity (community) of reality.

Induction (from Latin inductio - guidance) is a method of cognition based on inferences from the particular to the general, when consciousness moves from particular knowledge to the general, to the knowledge of laws. Scientific induction establishes causal relationships based on the repetition and interrelation of essential properties of some things and phenomena of a certain group, and from them to the identification of universal causal relationships. Inductive inferences do not provide reliable knowledge, but only “suggest” thought to identify such knowledge.

Deduction (from Latin deductio - deduction) is a method of cognition, the opposite of induction, based on inferences from the general to the particular. Deductive inferences provide reliable knowledge provided that it is contained in the relevant premises. In real knowledge, deduction and induction are interrelated. The constructiveness of the deductive method is associated with the subject-practical and sociocultural activities of a person. In other words, its effectiveness is determined by the accumulation and theoretical interpretation of the relevant empirical material.

Analysis and synthesis. The mental and real process of dismembering the whole into its component parts with the subsequent acquisition of lost integrity.

Analysis (from the Greek analysis - decomposition) - a method of learning associated with the mental division of a thing, phenomenon or process into its constituent elements for the purpose of knowledge. The analytical method allows us to recognize a part as an element of the whole.

Synthesis (from the Greek synthesis - connection) is the opposite mental operation associated with the unification of the elements of an object into a whole. Analysis and synthesis are interconnected.

Essentially, synthesis is a cognitive process enriched with the results of the analytical method. Moreover, from a general method of cognition, analysis and synthesis are transformed into special research methods corresponding to specific sciences (mathematical analysis, synthetic chemistry, etc.).

Classification and generalization. Logical ordering of scientific objects and processes of reality.

Classification (from the Latin classis - category and facere - to do) is a method of dividing the things, phenomena or processes under study into separate groups in accordance with certain characteristics. The following are distinguished: natural classification, within which significant similarities and differences of objects are identified (for example, in biology); and artificial classification (say, a library alphabetical catalogue). Classification according to essential characteristics is characterized as a typology. Any classification is quite conditional and relative, improving in the process of cognition of real objects. Classification is a form of generalization.

Generalization is a method of thinking within which the general properties, signs and qualities of things, phenomena and processes of reality are identified. The resulting generalized knowledge means an in-depth reflection of reality and indicates further insight into the essence of the object under study. Thus, if within the framework of the classification the specific characteristics of an object are identified (for example, the concepts of “birch”, “poplar”, “maple”, etc.), then the generalization reaches the level of generic characteristics (in this case, the concept of “tree”) , discarding signs of a specific nature.

Analogy and similarity. Identification of similar elements in dissimilar objects and systems.

Analogy (Greek analogia - correspondence) is a method based on identifying similarities in some respects, aspects and qualities of non-identical objects. Relies on the logical method of inference by analogy. In the early stages of the development of science, analogy replaced experiment and observation. Thus, ancient pre-science (natural philosophy) proceeded from the identity of the microcosm (man) and the macrocosm (nature). Later, on the basis of analogy, the similarity of the human body and the state, the organism with the human mechanism, was substantiated.

Similarity is a variant of analogy; it is used, however, to compare similar objects, but of different scales. For example, “similar triangles” are distinguished, i.e. geometric shapes characterized by different scales.

Abstraction and idealization. Theoretical identification and consideration of an object or process that does not actually exist.

Abstraction (from the Latin abstractio - distraction) is the process of mentally highlighting individual aspects, properties, qualities or relationships of a thing, phenomenon or process with simultaneous abstraction from their other characteristics, which in a given research context are not considered as defining. The abstraction method allows you to gain a deeper understanding of what is being studied. phenomenon.

Idealization (from the Greek idea - image, representation) is a thought process that involves the selection of some abstract object that fundamentally does not exist in objective reality. These objects act as a means of scientific analysis, the basis of a theory. “Idealized” objects are characteristic of the entire system of scientific knowledge, namely: in mathematics – “absolutely black body”; in physics – “point”; in chemistry – “ideal solution”; in sociology – “type of rationality”; in cultural studies - “cultural-historical type”, etc.

Idealization is a form of expression of abstraction. It is in the process of idealization that an extreme abstraction from the real properties and qualities of a thing or phenomenon occurs with the simultaneous introduction into the content of the concepts being formed of features that do not exist in reality. Let's say, the concept of a “material point” is an ideal object, but its use is not only of a theoretical nature (in the process of creating a scientific theory), but also of a practical application (for example, for calculating the movement of specific material objects). The concept of “Western type of rationality” (M. Weber) allows, for example, to give a theoretical analysis of the foundations of Western civilization (“Protestant ethics”).

Simulation and thought experiment. Identification of the relationship between a real object (process) and its analogue.

Modeling (from the French modell - sample) is a method in which the object under study (original) is replaced by another (model) specially created for its study. Modeling is used when studying a thing, phenomenon or process is impossible or difficult for one reason or another.

There are several types of modeling, namely: physical, mathematical, logical, computer. Modeling capabilities are increasing as computerization improves - from local to global modeling, i.e., to the construction of planetary-scale models.

One type of modeling is a thought experiment. This is a method of scientific thinking, similar to the structure of a material experiment, with the help of which, relying on theoretical knowledge and empirical data, constructing ideal models of the object being studied and the conditions interacting with it, the essence of the theoretical problem is revealed. In a thought experiment, one operates with ideal objects and ideal conditions affecting them. Mental conditions are constructed on the basis of both experimental and theoretical methods of cognition.

Mathematization. One of the fundamental methods of a general scientific nature, giving empirical knowledge a theoretical status.

Mathematization (from the Greek mathema - knowledge) is the penetration of mathematical methods into all spheres of scientific knowledge, the existing system of sciences.

Mathematization manifests itself in various ways in the sciences. A special relationship develops between physics and mathematics. If in classical physics a theory of corresponding processes was initially created, for which a suitable mathematical apparatus was later constructed, then modern physics creates a mathematical apparatus corresponding to the new theory. In other words, modern theory reveals the physical meaning in abstract mathematical constructions. The use of mathematical methods made it possible to create theoretical biology; mathematization of chemistry has significantly increased the possibilities of organic synthesis; the use of mathematics in geography promoted it to the group of leading natural sciences. Mathematization is actively used in the socio-economic and humanitarian sciences (economic mathematics, mathematical sociology, etc.).

Both universal principles and general scientific methods of cognition are “complementary” in relation to each other. It is in the process of their interaction that an adequate idea of objective reality in its integrity is formed.

5. Dynamics of scientism and anti-scientism

Science is integral part culture. In different historical periods of the development of civilization, the dominant culture was determined by different forms of social consciousness, namely: in the ancient period, the basis of the civilizational process was myth, in the medieval period - religion, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment - philosophy.

In the modern era, science is gradually becoming a determining factor in the development of sociocultural processes of civilization. It is science, and especially the forms of its implementation, that increasingly determine the specifics of the relationship between man, society and the natural environment.

In European culture, since the ancient period, an idea has been formed, according to which knowledge is considered as a good, that is, science is interpreted as a phenomenon with intrinsic value. In the dynamics of historical development, this led to scientism - a worldview that absolutizes the role of science and scientific knowledge in the sociocultural process. Moreover, science was presented as a model for the development of culture.

Modern forms of scientism are characteristic of the 20th century, when the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution era were viewed primarily as positive phenomena that ensure the dynamism of scientific and technological (and socio-economic) progress. Within the framework of scientism, the dominant idea is that most of the problems that arise in the system of human relationships with the outside world can be solved with the help of scientific and technical methods and technologies. Scientism merges with technocratism in its desire to resolve the socio-economic contradictions of society on the basis of scientific management methods.

Scientism and technocratism developed in the second half of the 20th century. in the form of theories of post-industrialism, according to which traditional industrial society must (and can) overcome internal conflicts in the process of adjusting existing directions and guidelines for development (“ecological revolution”, “information revolution, etc.). The dynamism of modern “post-industrial society” confirms, as many scientists believe, the effectiveness of the ideology of scientism.

An alternative to scientism is "anti-scientism" - a worldview that focuses on the negative aspects and consequences of the development of science. If at the initial stages of its active dynamics scientism prevailed (anti-scientism was not clearly manifested), then gradually anti-scientism occupies an increasingly significant place in the analysis of the status of science in society.

And if initially anscientism was based on the negative consequences of the development of physics, then later the experience of biology and genetic engineering was used in this context; chemistry with the negative impact of its derivatives on the biosphere. Psychology can be used to manipulate the human personality, and sociology can be used to influence public consciousness and the behavior of certain groups of society, etc.

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. The question is formulated as follows: is science good or evil? Is its development a benefit or a threat to the existence of man, society and the biosphere?

In the history of science, it is figuratively customary to distinguish two types of scientific knowledge. Namely: science of the “Apollonovsky” and “Faustian” type. In the first case, we mean the science of the ancient period with its contemplation, passivity, locality, irrationality; secondly, modern science with its activity, dynamism, globality, and rationality. It is with these characteristics that the ideas about the “crisis” of scientific knowledge and the “dead-end” direction of its development are associated.

Indeed, science of the Western (Faustian) type has determined the high level of development of modern civilization. And yet, its historically established characteristics are subject to significant criticism. Let's say a point of view is justified. according to which, for example, rationalism, as one of the defining characteristics of Western-type science, is by no means a sufficient principle for the formation of an adequate scientific picture of the world - a true idea of active reality. It is necessary, within the framework of this point of view, to “supplement” rationalism with views of an irrationalistic nature.

At the end of the 20th century. What is happening is not a “crisis” of natural science knowledge, but a paradigm shift (Greek paradeigma - sample), i.e. traditional theoretical, philosophical, sociocultural prerequisites that determine the development of science.

At the end of the 20th century. a tendency is revealed to bridge the “gap” between natural science (technical) and humanitarian knowledge, the sciences of nature, technology and man. The degree of “humanization” of science is increasing, i.e. its relationship with the sociocultural processes of reality is strengthened. At the same time, the process of “scientification” of culture is intensifying, due to the penetration of scientific ideas, concepts and ideas into the body of knowledge about man and society.

Conclusion

The modern scientific picture of the world is becoming increasingly systemic and integrative in nature. Within its framework, prerequisites are created for the “transfer” of basic concepts and ideas from the sphere of natural sciences to the field of humanities. Natural scientific and sociocultural processes are considered in the dynamics of their changes. We are talking about the prerequisites and conditions for the formation of a holistic picture of the world, to which modern scientific knowledge strives.

References

1. History and philosophy of science. Ursul A.D., RAGS Publishing House, Moscow, 2006

Man has sought to understand himself, the world around him, and the phenomena that occur in it for thousands of years. In other words, cognition is the process of comprehending the surrounding world and oneself in this world. Cognition as a form of spiritual activity has existed in society since its inception and has gone through certain stages of development along with it. At each of them, the process of cognition is carried out in diverse and interconnected socio-cultural forms developed in the course of human history. The following forms of knowledge are distinguished: everyday, playful, mythological, artistic and figurative, philosophical, religious, personal, scientific knowledge. Although they are related, each of them has its own specifics. Since the subject of this study is scientific knowledge, there is no need to consider other forms of knowledge.

Let us consider the main features of scientific knowledge (scientific criteria):

1. The main task of scientific knowledge is the discovery of objective laws of reality - natural, social, laws of cognition itself, thinking, etc. Hence the orientation of research mainly on the essential properties of an object and their expression in a system of abstractions.
2. Based on knowledge of the laws of functioning and development of the objects under study, science predicts the future with the aim of further practical development of reality.
3. An essential feature of scientific knowledge is its systematic nature, that is, the body of knowledge put in order on the basis of certain theoretical principles, which unite individual knowledge into an integral organic system.
4. Science is characterized by constant methodological reflection. This means that in it the study of objects, the identification of their specificity, properties and connections is always accompanied by an awareness of the methods and techniques by which these objects are studied.
5. Scientific knowledge is a contradictory process of reproduction of knowledge that forms an integral developing system of concepts, theories, hypotheses, laws and other ideal forms.
6. In the process of scientific knowledge, such specific material means as devices, instruments, and other scientific equipment are used. Also, science is characterized by the use of such spiritual means and methods as modern logic, mathematical methods, dialectics, etc. to study its objects and itself.
7. Scientific knowledge is characterized by strict evidence, validity of the results obtained, and reliability of the conclusions. At the same time, there are many hypotheses, conjectures, assumptions, probabilistic judgments, etc. That is why the perfection of the researchers’ thinking is of utmost importance here.
8. The immediate goal and highest value of scientific knowledge is objective truth, comprehended primarily by rational means and methods, but not without the participation of living contemplation. From here characteristic feature scientific knowledge - objectivity.

Scientific truth is knowledge that meets two types of requirements: firstly, it corresponds to reality; secondly, it satisfies a number of scientific criteria. The following criteria of scientific truth are distinguished:

- logical consistency. Assumes that true knowledge must be expressed in logically consistent forms;
- coherence (systematicity) assumes that new knowledge should be well consistent with those results that are already assessed as true. Of two theories, the one that is more compatible with fundamental knowledge is recognized as true;
- heuristic. A more heuristic theory is one that helps predict new facts, provides an increase in knowledge, and does not simply systematize already known facts;
- simplicity. Of the two theories, preference should be given to the one that explains reality based on a smaller number of independent assumptions, i.e. more simple;
- conventional concept. Truth is the result of a coincidence of the perceptions of the majority or the result of an agreement;
- pragmatic concept. Truth lies in the usefulness of knowledge, its effectiveness.

These criteria should not be viewed as immutable. They are a product of the historical development of science and may change in the future.

However, the most important criterion for the truth of knowledge is practice. Testing knowledge by practice is a process, that is, it is historical in nature. This means that the criterion of practice is both absolute and relative. Absolute because developing practice in the fullness of its content can definitively prove any theoretical or other provisions. At the same time, this criterion is relative, since practice itself develops and therefore it cannot, at any given moment, immediately and completely prove certain conclusions obtained in the process of cognition. Perhaps Francis Bacon had in mind precisely the importance of applying the criterion of practice in the following lines: “But the most serious of all errors is to deviate from the ultimate goal of science. After all, some people strive for knowledge due to innate and boundless curiosity, others - for the sake of pleasure, others - to gain authority, fourth - to gain the upper hand in competition and dispute, the majority - for the sake of material gain and only a very few - in order to gain God directs the gift of reason to benefit the human race. Science is a rich repository and treasury created for the glory of the creator of all things and to help humanity. After all, it is precisely the service of this goal that would truly embellish science and raise its significance if theory and practice were united by stronger bonds than before.”

From all of the above it follows that scientific knowledge is a developing system of knowledge, which includes two main levels - empirical and theoretical. Although they are related to each other, each has its own specifics. Empirical (experimental) research is aimed directly at its object. It masters it with the help of such techniques and means as measurement, observation, experiment, etc., and its most important element is fact. Any scientific research begins with the collection, systematization and synthesis of facts. The concept of “fact” has the following basic meanings:

1) a certain fragment of reality, objective events, results related either to objective reality or to the sphere of consciousness and cognition;
2) knowledge of any event, the reliability of which has been proven;
3) a sentence fixing empirical knowledge.

The second and third of these meanings are summarized in the concept of “scientific fact”. In scientific knowledge, facts play a dual role:

- a set of facts forms the empirical basis for putting forward hypotheses and building theories;
- Facts are crucial in confirming or disproving theories.

It is worth noting that, according to Bacon, scientific knowledge of nature is possible only on the basis of experience, the experimental method of research: “Science improves nature, but is itself improved by experience, for natural talents are like wild plants and need to be cultivated with the help of scientific studies, and scholarship in itself gives instructions that are too general if they are not clarified by experience. Cunning people despise learning, simple-minded people marvel at it, wise people use it. For learning in itself does not teach how to apply it: that is, a special, higher wisdom, which can only be acquired by experience.”

The theoretical level of scientific knowledge is characterized by the predominance of the rational element - concepts, theories, laws and other forms of thinking. Living contemplation, sensory cognition is not eliminated here, but becomes a subordinate aspect of the cognitive process. Theoretical knowledge reflects phenomena and processes from their universal internal connections and patterns, comprehended through rational processing of empirical knowledge data. When considering theoretical knowledge, one should determine its structural components. The main ones include the problem, hypothesis and theory, which act as “key points” in the construction and development of knowledge at the theoretical level.

A problem is a form of theoretical knowledge, the content of which is that which has not yet been known by man, but which needs to be known. A problem is a process that includes two main points - its formulation and solution. Correct derivation of problematic knowledge from previous facts and generalizations, the ability to correctly pose a problem is a necessary prerequisite for its successful solution.

A hypothesis is a form of theoretical knowledge that contains an assumption formulated on the basis of a number of facts, the true meaning of which is uncertain and requires proof. In the course of proving the put forward hypotheses, some of them become a true theory, others are clarified, others are discarded and turn into delusions if the test gives a negative result. In methodology, the term “hypothesis” is used in two senses: as a form of existence of knowledge, characterized by unreliability and the need for proof, and as a method of forming and justifying explanatory proposals, leading to the establishment of laws, principles, and theories.

Theory is the most developed form of scientific knowledge, providing a holistic reflection of the natural and essential connections of a certain area of reality. Highlight following features theories:

- theory is not individual reliable scientific positions, but their totality, an integral organic developing system;
- in order to turn into a theory, knowledge must not only describe a certain set of facts, but also explain them;
- for a theory, justification and proof of its provisions are mandatory;
- theoretical knowledge should strive to explain the widest possible range of phenomena;
- the nature of a theory is determined by the degree of validity of its defining principle, reflecting the fundamental regularity of a given subject.

ABSTRACT ON PHILOSOPHY

on the topic:

SCIENCE AS A SPECIAL FORM OF KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY

Completed by: Lieutenant Timakov D.S.

Tver 2006

Introduction

The third part will describe scientific truth as a social phenomenon. The fourth part presents the basic universal principles and general scientific methods of cognition and their description.

1. Systematicity of the phenomenon of science

If we clarify this rather general definition, then we should distinguish several areas of scientific activity that specify it. Namely:

– identification of not external, but essential characteristics of reality;

– formation of a logically consistent system of knowledge about the objective picture of the world;

– forecasting the state of real objects and processes based on identified natural and social laws;

– creation and development of special means of cognitive activity (mathematical methods, research equipment, etc.);

– the spread of a special type of professional activity (scientists, engineers, etc.) in the sphere of social division of labor;

The terms “science” (“science”) and “scientist” (“scientist”) arose in the first half of the 19th century. in European university practice. They designated activities in the field of mathematics, physics, chemistry and other natural sciences. The term “social science” was later used for activities in the field of social sciences.

In the process of the genesis and development of scientific knowledge, attention to its classification increased. Let us note some milestones in this process.

Representatives of the French Enlightenment (Diderot, 1713-1784; and others), within the framework of the “Encyclopedia, or Explanatory Dictionary of Sciences, Arts and Crafts,” highlighted mechanics, physics, chemistry, physiology, etc.

A. de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) proposed classifications of sciences by analogy with the class structure of society (slave and feudal society - theology, capitalism - positivism, etc.).

By the 20th century, the following system of sciences had developed:

– natural science (natural sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about nature;

– technical knowledge (technical sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about technical systems; sciences focused on the implementation of natural science knowledge;

– human studies (social and human sciences) – a system of scientific knowledge about man and society and the socio-cultural environment of his habitat.

Adjacent integrativeness. The relationship of scientific disciplines genetically and historically interacting with each other (physical chemistry, biophysics, economic mathematics, etc.)

Here the material world appears, the objective reality, with which it interacts and which... cards, recipes and others forms information directly consumed in... did not exist at all science How special activities. Cognition the surrounding world...

Philosophy and methodology science

Study Guide >> Philosophy

Philosophy, methodology and logic science, as well as philosophical theory knowledge. Research science How special social phenomenon (community... truth. This forms rational consciousness is characterized by the pathos of maximum attention to reality. If from the point...

Sociocultural and institutional nature science

Textbook >> Sociology

Can science How special form consciousness to be basic... critical attitude towards traditional forms knowledge. Rationality in this sense... How subject knowledge into the system science. It became clear that in science we are not dealing with a picture reality How ...

Concept of philosophy How about the type of worldview.

Abstract >> Philosophy

What is philosophy How special science, claiming to be a substantive study special spheres reality, not... 1. Diversity forms knowledge. 2. Subject and object knowledge. 3. Truth How target knowledge. 4. Science How specialized form knowledge. The term "...

Science- this is the form and result of people’s activity to reveal the objective laws of existence of nature, society and man.

The peculiarities of scientific objects require the use of a special language with a strictly verified meaning of individual words, as well as special tools and methods of research activity. One of the most important methods of science, which largely determines its appearance, is idealization. Scientific knowledge constantly resorts to the creation of ideal objects, models that represent real objects (too changeable and involved in many connections) only in certain aspects. Hence the inherent tendency of science to reductionism, i.e., simplifying reality in the process of its rational comprehension.

Science is also characterized by a special ethos, otherwise a set of norms of behavior and communication accepted in the scientific community.

In modern society - and not only among scientists - the position remains quite influential scientism, according to which science acts as the main and perhaps the only instrument of human orientation in the world, the most important source of human well-being.

40. Structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge

Scientific knowledge is carried out on two interconnected, but still having their own specificity levels– empirical and theoretical.

Empirical knowledge(Greek empeiria - experience) is aimed directly at its object, it practically interacts with it, reflects its external aspects and connections accessible to sensory contemplation. The main methods used are observation and experiment.

Theoretical knowledge reflects phenomena and processes from their internal, essential connections, comprehended through rational processing of empirical knowledge. In this case, such methods of cognition as: idealization, abstraction (abstraction from a number of properties and relationships of objects), (deduction (transition from general knowledge to particular), axiomatic method (building a theory based on a number of axioms or postulates), etc. are widely used .

The theory itself is, of course, the highest form of not only theoretical, but also scientific knowledge in general (it is not for nothing that M. Heidegger defined science as the theory of the real). Theory is an internally consistent system of fundamental ideas and laws that gives a holistic view of the essential connections in the set of objects under consideration. Two important requirements for any scientific theory, allowing us to distinguish it from pseudo-scientific speculation, - verifiability And falsifiability. According to the principle of verification, a concept or proposition has meaning only if it is empirically verifiable. The principle of falsification insists that any scientific theory allows for risky predictions, the failure of which in practice would refute it.

Important role in the development of theory the correct formulation of the problem plays a role. Problem- a form of theoretical knowledge, the content of which is what has not yet been known by man, but what needs to be known.

Reflecting on problems, scientists put forward hypotheses. Hypothesis is a scientific assumption that solves the problem probabilistically.

Science concept. The problem of defining science is one of the most difficult in modern research in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of science. There are many definitions of science and scientific knowledge, each of which identifies as a defining feature or essential characteristic of science: a set of specific cognitive procedures (experiment, description, classification, explanation, etc.); the objective-subject nature of knowledge obtained as a result of scientific research; the level of systemic organization and validity of scientific knowledge, etc. Such pluralism of approaches and methodological orientations in defining science is understandable and explainable, since in modern conditions it reveals its obvious multifunctionality and can be interpreted as a specific method of cognition, a social institution, a form of accumulation of knowledge and cognitive traditions, factor in the development of production and modern operating technologies, etc.

However, as soon as we are faced with the task of defining science as a unique phenomenon of modern culture, in its integrity and significant differences from such forms of spiritual and cognitive activity as mythology, religion, philosophy, everyday knowledge, etc., we are faced with a number of serious logical, conceptual and subject-substantive problems. Let's point out some of them.

1. The problem of the logical circle in the definition of science, associated with the need to correctly answer the question of where, when and in what sociocultural conditions science first arises and the transition from protoscience to the proper scientific forms of knowledge of the world takes place.

2. The problem of structural and functional differentiation of modern science and the identification of such basic parameters as cognitive activity in accordance with certain logical and methodological norms and imperatives; scientific knowledge with appropriate cognitive and logical characteristics; a social institution as a form of organization and regulation of scientific research, as well as a communication system in science.

3. The problem of subject-disciplinary differentiation of science and determining the specific features of logical-mathematical, natural science, technical and social-humanitarian knowledge. One of the most important dimensions of this problem in modern conditions is the substantiation of the special status of interdisciplinary research and the identification of the specific features of such integrative directions in science that synthesize various scientific disciplines and their characteristic methods and means of knowledge.

A clear explication of the specific features of science and the justification for its categorical definition presuppose a meaningful analysis and correct interpretation of the above problems. It is no coincidence that one of the founders of modern science, J. Bernal, noted that it is essentially impossible to define science. We can only outline the paths by following which we can get closer to understanding what science is.

First of all, science should become the subject of structural analysis, in the process of which its main components are isolated, the substantive and functional characteristics of each of them are revealed, which makes it possible to significantly deepen the everyday understanding of science and various purely descriptive models of its description.

The main structural components of science as a systemic integrity or the most important parameters of the existence of science include:

1) science as an activity;

2) science as knowledge;

3) science as a social institution.

1. Science as an activity is a creative process of subject-object interaction aimed at the production and reproduction of new objectively true knowledge about reality.

A special analysis of scientific activity makes it possible to record a number of characteristic features of science that distinguish it from other types of spiritual-cognitive activity and, in particular, various forms of ordinary or non-specialized knowledge, which are very actively used in everyday human life and constitute the so-called “logic” common sense. In the structure of any activity, including scientific activity, one can isolate such components as subject, object (or subject), means and methods, goals and programs, results or products. It is characteristic that in all these parameters scientific activity differs significantly from other types of cognitive activity and forms of knowledge generation. So, for example, in acts of ordinary or non-specialized cognition, the subject, as a rule, is formed in the process of natural socialization and the acquisition of traditional skills of cognitive and practical activity. In science, a special system of professional socialization is emerging, which involves the subject mastering a huge information array of knowledge, skills, forms and methods of communication.

Equally significant are the differences between scientific and everyday forms of cognitive activity in their object or subject. Ordinary cognition masters only those objects or subject complexes that are directly included in the structure of a person’s practical activity and constitute the space of his life world or everyday experience. Science constructs a special world of idealized objects, an objective reality that is not represented in the real forms of human practical activity or in his everyday empirical experience. The subject of science is always the result of the creative construction of a type of reality that can only be mastered in future forms of practice.

Since scientific-cognitive activity is one of the most complex and developed forms of knowledge of the world, it also differs significantly from other types of knowledge in terms of such parameters in the structure of this activity as its means, methods, goals and programs. Modern science uses many diverse and carefully adapted to the subject complexes under study means of knowledge of nature, society and spiritual-psychic reality. Among them are material resources, constituting the experimental-measuring or instrumental base of modern science. Conceptual and logical tools– which include specialized artificial languages and categorical systems, logical and methodological standards and standards for the organization of knowledge, its validity and objective truth. Mathematical tools– including various systems of mathematical languages and formalisms designed to provide procedures for describing, explaining and predicting the phenomena and processes under study in accordance with the requirements of logical consistency, accuracy, and substantive certainty.

One of distinctive features scientific and educational activity is characterized by methodological reflection aimed at understanding and constantly evaluating the activities carried out cognitive actions, as well as the development of a system of special methods and tools designed to optimize these actions and contribute to the achievement of objectively true knowledge about the reality under study. Unlike science, in acts of ordinary or non-specialized cognition, methods and forms of obtaining knowledge are not realized and not analyzed. They are, as it were, “melted” into the fabric of real cognitive actions and are acquired by the subject directly in the process of education, natural socialization and familiarization with certain customs and traditions.

Scientific activity is fundamentally different from other types and forms of knowledge also in its result or final product. Any cognitive action should ideally be aimed at obtaining knowledge or information about the cognizable phenomenon. However, in different forms and at different levels of cognition, this information is specified according to a number of essential features. Its content can represent the objective and objective aspects of the existence of phenomena and processes of reality. It can capture subjectively and personally significant meanings of the social world and the cultural universe. This may be information about the values, programs and goals of possible acts of activity of an individual, a social group or society as a whole. At the same time, it is very important to fix those properties and parameters that distinguish scientific knowledge as a specific type of information and the final product of scientific and cognitive activity. This characteristic of science presupposes its analysis as a specific system of knowledge.

2. Science as knowledge. The implementation of a person’s cognitive relationship to the world creates the prerequisites for the translation of cognizable objects into an ideal-sign form, in which they are deobjectified and acquire the status of knowledge. Various typologies of knowledge as a product of spiritual and cognitive activity are possible. Depending on the specifics of the cognizable reality, knowledge is distinguished as information about the objective world of nature and society; knowledge about the inner spiritual-psychic world of a person, which contains ideas about the essence and meaning of self-knowledge; knowledge about the goals and ideal-theoretical programs of human activity, etc. At the same time, each of these types of knowledge can exist in the forms of proto-scientific, extra-scientific and scientific knowledge. At the same time, knowledge itself is a type of information about the phenomena and processes of reality being studied that must satisfy a number of requirements or scientific criteria.

The problem of criteria for the scientific nature of knowledge is one of the most controversial in modern philosophy of science and, depending on the tasks and objectives of the research, various groups of criteria for scientific nature are distinguished. So, for example, in order to record historically specific forms of scientific knowledge and distinguish them from protoscience, a set of historical criteria of scientific character. These usually include:

a) formal-logical consistency of knowledge;

b) its experimental verifiability and empirical validity;

c) the rational nature of knowledge;

d) reproducibility and semantic invariance;

e) intersubjectivity and universality, etc.

Other types of historical criteria for scientific character make it possible to specify various historical stages of the development of science and the corresponding forms of knowledge. At the same time, classical, non-classical and post-non-classical science are distinguished; disciplinary and interdisciplinary organized systems of scientific knowledge, etc.

Another group of scientific standards is called function-oriented criteria. These include: logical criteria, such as consistency, completeness, independence of the original axioms, etc. This group also includes such requirements for scientific knowledge systems as their simplicity, aesthetic significance, instrumental efficiency. These criteria are called pragmatic.

However, no matter how varied the various groups of criteria for the scientific nature of knowledge, all of them should ultimately only complement some basic characteristics of knowledge that are attributable to science and determine its special status and functions in the total knowledge of natural, social and spiritual-psychic reality.

Science has always strived to see the reality under study as a set of causally determined, natural events and phenomena, subject to certain regularities and patterns. These patterns can be both dynamic and static in nature, however, they necessarily capture the objectively objective aspect of the existence of the cognizable reality, which does not depend on the will and consciousness of the cognizing subject. This fundamental standard of scientific knowledge reveals itself in such essential requirements for the content and organization of scientific knowledge as consistency, evidence and validity, reliability and objective truth.

The analysis of science as a system of knowledge can be significantly supplemented and specified if its structural division is carried out on other grounds and in other functional “cuts”. Thus, within the framework of any scientific discipline (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, etc.) it is possible to isolate the structures of empirical knowledge, theoretical knowledge and metatheoretical knowledge. Each of these structural levels of knowledge organization specifies science and has a number of functional features. There are other typologies and classifications of scientific knowledge, within which natural science, mathematical, social, humanitarian, and technical knowledge are distinguished; fundamental scientific knowledge, applied scientific knowledge and knowledge in the form of experimental design projects and developments.

In order for science as an activity and knowledge to really exist in society, it must be organically integrated into the system of social connections and communications, i.e. act as a social institution.

3. Science as a social institution can be designated as a set of scientific organizations and institutions integrated by certain norms of scientific ethos, principles and methods of professional communication, as well as forms of relationship with a specific historical type of society.

The structural and content analysis of science as a social institution allows us to significantly complement the idea of it as a complex system of relationships between scientists, the scientific community and various subsystems of society. Isolating this aspect or dimension of science as a sociocultural integrity makes it possible to reconstruct the process of development and design of institutional structures of scientific activity and characterize such forms of organization of scientists as scientific schools, research laboratories and institutes, “invisible colleges”, etc. In this case, significant attention is usually focus on characterizing ways of transmitting knowledge, forms and methods of scientific communication both within scientific communities and in dialogue with society as a whole. In modern conditions of frontal intensification of scientific research, the development of effective systems of value-normative regulation of scientific activity, the study of ethical and sociocultural aspects of science as specific shape spiritual production and intellectual innovation. The freedom of scientific creativity and the social responsibility of a scientist are united in modern science as two inextricably linked aspects of a single process of scientific discovery and the use of its results in the social and economic life of society.

Thus, a structural analysis of the phenomenon of science allows us to significantly deepen our understanding of it and give a meaningful description of its most important components.

Further concretization of the image of science and filling it with real content, reflecting the processes of integration of scientific knowledge and high technology in all spheres of life in modern society, involves analysis and characterization of the main functions of science. Theoretical reconstruction of the history of the formation and development of science as a unique form of knowledge and transformation of the world makes it possible to record the many functions that it has implemented in various types of society and culture. Nevertheless, among them we can identify several of the most important and invariant ones. These usually include:

1) Cultural and ideological function;

2) Industrial production function;

3) The function of social management and rationalization of social relations;

4) The function of generating and reproducing scientific knowledge in education systems and transmitting social experience.

These functions of science make it possible to characterize it in more detail and meaningfully not only as a cognitive-cognitive phenomenon, but also to reveal its sociocultural nature, fixing the role and significance of science in the dynamics of civilization and the functioning of modern society.

Structural-functional analysis of science allows us to identify and record various aspects of its content, describe the forms of its interaction with other cultural phenomena and cognitive actions. However, the task of categorically defining science presupposes the fixation and substantiation of its features, which represent the main and most essential features of science as a specific and unique type of spiritual-cognitive activity. The following features of science can be identified as such features, which fundamentally distinguish it from other types and forms of knowledge:

1) objective-subject orientation of scientific knowledge;

2) the constructive and creative nature of science, which consists in the fact that it explores not only objects mastered in existing forms of social activity, but also creates theoretical models of potentially possible objects and their interactions in the practice of the future.

Consideration of science as a systemic integrity in the unity of its main structural components, taking into account the main and most specific characteristics of scientific knowledge, allows us to define science as follows. Science –This is a form of socially organized cognitive activity in which, on the basis of an advanced reflection of reality, its rational and conceptual development is carried out, recorded in the system of objective, objectively true, new knowledge.

Forms of reflexive understanding of scientific knowledge. Problem field of philosophy of science. The study of science as one of the dominant components of modern culture is characterized by an impressive variety of forms, genres and styles of its description and interpretation. As a rule, there is a significant influence of traditions philosophical analysis knowledge on the forms and methods of modern science studies. Philosophy of knowledge as one of the main sections of any developed system of philosophical knowledge is usually considered as integrating the following main components:

1) traditional or classical epistemology (theory of knowledge);

2) modern epistemological concepts, which present interpretations of cognition and knowledge, based on the principles of post-classical philosophizing;

3) philosophical and methodological analysis of scientific knowledge and the forms of its constitution in various sociocultural systems.

Within the framework of this course, the substantive analysis of the third component is of greatest interest, since its development and legitimization in modern science research has led to the formulation of the philosophy of science as a system-oriented strategy for the study of science in the unity of its cognitive, methodological and sociocultural characteristics. The synthetic intentions of the philosophy of science could be realized only insofar as its models and concepts widely used results and conceptual approaches substantiated in other disciplines studying science.

With a certain degree of convention, the entire body of knowledge about science and the main directions of its study and research can be divided into three blocks:

1) Disciplinary studies of science (history of science, sociology of science, psychology of science, logic of science, etc.)

2) Interdisciplinary research of science, which most fully reveals its orientations within the framework of the so-called science of science.

3) Philosophical and methodological analysis of scientific knowledge, on the basis of which the philosophy of science is developed as a form of systematic understanding of the phenomenon of science in its historical dynamics and functioning in the modern sociocultural environment.

Speaking about the philosophy of science, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the two main meanings of this terminological construct. On the one hand, the philosophy of science is understood as a set of epistemological concepts about the nature, functions and dynamics of scientific knowledge, developed in Western and domestic philosophy of knowledge during the twentieth century. On the other hand, the philosophy of science is developing today in the form of a systematically organized body of knowledge about the logical-cognitive, methodological and sociocultural aspects of the existence of science as a specific and unique component of modern culture.

The formation of the philosophy of science as a special type of theoretical and methodological reflection on scientific knowledge and the forms of its assimilation in the economic and social life of society is usually associated with the so-called first positivism of the 19th century and the activities of its most famous representatives (O. Comte, J. Mill, G. Spencer ). The positivist doctrine of science receives its further development and more differentiated interpretation in the epistemological programs of empirio-criticism (E. Mach, R. Avenarius, A. Bogdanov, etc.); in the conventionalism of A. Poincaré and P. Duhem; in instrumentalist versions of the interpretation of science and scientific research (J. Dewey, P. Bridgman, etc.)

The next fundamental step in the development of the philosophy of science as a specific direction in the analysis and understanding of the phenomenon of scientific knowledge was made by representatives of neopositivist philosophy. This applies primarily to the analysis of the foundations of mathematics within the framework of the logicist program (G. Frege, B. Russell); the development of the philosophy of logical positivism through the efforts of L. Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Circle (M. Schlick, R. Carnap, O. Neurath, G. Reichenbach, etc.). During this period, the neopositivist program of logical analysis of the language of science reveals itself in the forms of radical reductionism and verificationism, offering models of empirical justification for the universal language of science, a rigid demarcation of scientific knowledge and metaphysics.

The next stage in the development of Western philosophy of science is the development of a fallibilistic model of scientific knowledge, presented primarily in the concepts of falsificationism by K. Popper and the methodology of scientific research programs by I. Lakatos. Popper's philosophy of critical rationalism receives its development and concretization in the neo-rationalism of G. Bachelard and the post-critical philosophy of science of M. Polanyi.

In the 60s and 70s of the twentieth century, relativistic and historicist tendencies in the analysis and methodological understanding of the phenomenon of scientific knowledge became noticeably more active in Western philosophy of science. These trends reveal themselves most clearly in various schools and directions of postpositivist philosophy of science, which focuses on the study of historical, psychological, sociocultural aspects of scientific knowledge (T. Kuhn, S. Toulmin, P. Feyerabend, D. Bohm, J. Holton, L. . Laudan, etc.)

The current situation in Western philosophy of science is characterized by the intensive development of two dominant trends in the analysis and interpretation of science and the forms of research practice characteristic of it. First of all, these are various schools and directions of analytical and linguistic philosophy (P. Strawson, N. Chomsky, D. Davidson, J. Searle, M. Dummett, etc.), as well as active polemics between representatives of scientific realism, on the one hand ( H. Putnam, W. Sellars, B. van Frassen) instrumentalism and radical constructivism - on the other (G. Folmer, H. Maturana, F. Varela, N. Goodman, etc.)

Various forms of philosophical and methodological analysis of social and humanitarian cognition and knowledge were developed and constituted within the framework of the structuralist program (C. Lévi-Strauss, J. Lacan, M. Foucault, R. Barthes, etc.), and then in the core of poststructuralist interpretations language and “logic” of the humanities (J. Deleuze, F. Baudrillard, J. Derrida, etc.)

No less well-known and popular in Western philosophy of science are various versions of hermeneutical interpretations of the language of science and forms of its mediation in culture (G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur, C.-O. Appel, etc.)

Domestic philosophers and methodologists also made an important contribution to the development of modern philosophy of science. In the models and concepts they developed for the structure, dynamics and functions of science in various types of society, the systemic-dialectical tradition of modern science of science was substantiated, which in many respects turned out to be more promising and adequate to the actual practice of scientific research than its Western analogues. The most famous and authoritative representatives of Russian philosophy of science include B.M. Kedrov, P.V. Kopnin, M.E. Omelyanovsky, V.A. Shtoff, V.S. Shvyrev, A.I. Rakitov, V.S. Stepin and others. Thanks to the fruitful work of these and many other scientists and philosophers, starting from the second half of the twentieth century, a number of schools and research centers have been formed and are thoroughly asserting themselves in the Russian philosophy of science. Among them are the Moscow, Minsk, Leningrad, Kiev, Novosibirsk, and Rostov schools, whose representatives continue to develop domestic traditions in the field of philosophy of science today.

Speaking about the subject area of the philosophy of science as a form of philosophical reflection on various aspects of the existence of science, and also bearing in mind that it is characterized by the intention to create a systematic picture of the “life of science” in the unity of its logical-cognitive, methodological and sociocultural characteristics, it is necessary to state the existence of many points of view on this issue and the presence of an impressive pluralism of interpretations. This state of affairs is quite understandable and explainable, since “philosophy of science” is an intensively developing field of knowledge about the most diverse projections and forms of manifestation of the “scientific spirit” in the modern sociocultural situation.

Let us point out some of the most typical and frequently encountered approaches to defining the subject area of the philosophy of science.

According to the well-known specialist in this field F. Frank, the central problem of the philosophy of science is to substantiate the necessity and real ways of transforming human cognition from the maxims of common sense and everyday thinking to natural scientific principles and methods of mastering the reality under study. K. Popper believed that the problem of the growth of knowledge and the associated analysis of competition in science, which inevitably accompanies any cognitive actions, should be considered as the central core of the problems of the philosophy of science.

There is a widespread opinion that the subject of philosophy of science combines several types or levels of analysis of science as a kind of systemic integrity and a specific component of modern culture:

1) analysis of the structure of science, presented in different forms of its existence (science as an activity, knowledge and social institution);

2) study of the fundamental functions of science in various sociocultural systems and the peculiarities of its existence in modern society;

3) studying the problem of the growth of knowledge and the sociodynamics of science in eras of scientific revolutions and during periods of “normal” existence;

4) axiological problems of science, within the framework of which numerous issues of the relationship and dialogue of science with society and various components of culture are considered.

Some authors argue that the most important task of the philosophy of science is the study of a certain cognitive component that borders between philosophy and real private scientific knowledge, which they call the foundations of science. As a rule, these include: ontological, epistemological, logical, methodological and value foundations.

A fairly popular point of view is that the main task of the philosophy of science is to analyze and consider the most important problems science. At the same time, various typologies and classifications of these problems are substantiated. These include: 1) general philosophical problems of science as a cognitive and cognitive integrity; 2) that block of problems that is characteristic of individual fields of knowledge (mathematics, natural sciences, technical and technological knowledge, social sciences and humanities), or specific scientific knowledge (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, etc.); 3) problems constituted depending on the direction of origin and the goals of the philosophical and methodological study of science (from philosophy to science or from science to philosophy).

The so-called descriptive approach to determining the status of the philosophy of science and its subject area has also become widespread. From the standpoint of this approach, philosophy of science is a description of various cognitive situations that occur both at the empirical and theoretical levels of scientific research. This type of situation may include a large array of cognitive actions and operations from “ad hoc” hypotheses to “case studies”, focused on the study of real single events in science with their subsequent extrapolation to a wide class of similar cognitive situations.

In modern literature, there are also attempts to substantiate such interpretations of the subject area of research within the framework of the philosophy of science, which are based on the principles of their historical and genetic classification. According to such approaches, the main problems of the philosophy of science in the first third of the twentieth century were the following questions:

– analysis of the problem of causality in physical knowledge and justification of the complex system of relations between determinism and indeterminism in modern natural science;

– study of dynamic and statistical patterns, forms and methods of their fixation in the structure of scientific knowledge;

– study of relationships and mediations between classical and quantum-relativistic scientific pictures of the world, etc.

The second third of the twentieth century is usually associated with the intensification of philosophical and methodological research in science in such areas as:

– analysis of the possibilities and boundaries of empirical substantiation of scientific knowledge;

– the problem of theoretical loading of experience;

– study of the contexts of the psychology of discovery and the logic of substantiation of scientific knowledge;

– development of problems of knowledge growth and metatheoretical structures of science, etc.

Finally, in the last third of the twentieth century and in recent research, questions related to analysis are becoming increasingly relevant:

– various types and forms of scientific rationality, as well as their changes in eras of cardinal transformations of science and scientific revolutions;

– cognitive and methodological capabilities of the history of science, psychology of scientific creativity, sociology of science and other disciplinary and interdisciplinary oriented areas of its study and research;

– a wide range of ideological, ethical, sociocultural and axiological problems of science and forms of its objectification in various fields life activity of modern society (economics, politics, culture, etc.);

– methodological ideas of global evolutionism, synergetics and principles of nonlinear thinking in modern scientific research;

– prospects and trends for the convergence of subject areas and methodological standards of the natural sciences and humanities, rational and non-rational factors as incentives and determinants of the latest research strategies and orientations in scientific research.

It is possible to record other interpretations of the subject area of the philosophy of science as a dynamically developing sphere of philosophical knowledge. However, what has been noted is quite enough to make a reasonable conclusion that modern philosophy of science is, in the process of intensive development, a strategy for the systematic study of science based on the use of the heuristic potential and methodological resources of the philosophy of knowledge.

The phenomenon of scientific rationality. Scientific and extra-scientific knowledge. European civilization has acquired the significance of a rationally organized civilization, which is characterized by the spirit of expedient and pragmatic solutions to emerging problems. In order to reveal the nature of this global orientation towards the structure of social reality and the principles of its historical change, it is necessary to answer the question of what constitutes the phenomenon of rationality as a certain characteristic of thought and action. It is usually associated with such parameters as expediency, efficiency, clarity and certainty, conformity with the law, etc.

It is obvious that in this context, rationality should be interpreted primarily as a specific characteristic of consciousness, creating the necessary prerequisites for achieving optimal and effective forms of cognition and transformation of reality. Traditionally, in classical philosophy, this characteristic of consciousness was associated with its ability to provide a conceptual, discursive and logically substantiated reflection of reality. And this ability itself was explained by the fact that in the structure of consciousness, along with sensations, perceptions, memory, emotions, will and other components, rational-logical thinking also stood out, which was proclaimed as the highest cognitive ability of the subject, providing him with the possibility of targeted, generalized and indirect cognition reality.

In modern interpretations, the structures of consciousness are often distinguished cognitive and mental layers or components. The first of them is responsible for the implementation of a rational-conceptual attitude towards the world and the desire to achieve objectively true knowledge about it. The second is for subjective experiences, value judgments and regulations, as well as emotional contexts of the “life of consciousness” (faith, hope, joy, melancholy, justice, etc.). Of course, really operating consciousness is always characterized by the inextricable unity of the cognitive and mental principles in its content, therefore the correct interpretation of rationality as a fundamental ability of consciousness should be based on taking into account this dialectical nature of it.

Thus, rationality as an integral characteristic of a person’s consciousness can be defined through the fixation of his ability, which provides him with the possibility of a generalized, indirect and essential reflection of reality, expressed in verbal-conceptual form. The presence of this ability of consciousness allows a person not only to cognize deep and regular connections and relationships, but also to ensure the possibility of effective transmission of knowledge in culture through the transfer of information, presented in the form of semiotic constructions, from one social system to another.

In modern culture, it is precisely such a formation as science that most clearly represents the rational ability of consciousness. Therefore, today it is more common to talk about the phenomenon of scientific rationality and analyze its various types.

The concept of “scientific rationality” is also very amorphous in content and polysemantic. Several semantic aspects of its content can be recorded:

1) the nature and level of orderliness of systems studied in science, which is fixed in the form of ideal objects of varying degrees of generality;

2) a method of conceptual-discursive description and explanation of the reality under study;

3) a set of norms and methods of scientific research, which is fixed in a certain type of methodological reflection or style of scientific thinking.

It is the third semantic aspect of the term “scientific rationality” that has become the most popular and in demand in modern philosophical and methodological literature. There are different models or types of scientific rationality interpreted in this way: inductivist (R. Carnap); deductive (Hempel); mesh (L. Laudan); thematic (J. Holton), etc.

One of the well-founded and widely known interpretations of scientific rationality is its historical-genetic concept developed in the Russian philosophy of science (V.S. Stepin, V.S. Shvyrev, P.P. Gaidenko, V.N. Porus, etc.), within which three historical types of scientific rationality are distinguished: classical